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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Memoir tells the story of my unsuccessful representation of 
former Illinois Governor George H. Ryan in the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
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the Seventh Circuit.  It describes how, in opinions authored by Judge 
Frank Easterbrook, the court made six rulings in favor of the government 
the government had not sought.  All of these rulings were questionable or 
worse, and the court afforded Ryan no opportunity to address most of 
them until after Judge Easterbrook’s opinions had been published.   
In addition, this Memoir documents eight falsehoods told by Judge 
Easterbrook in written opinions and statements from the bench.  These 
falsehoods included statements that the trial court gave instructions it did 
not give, that both the defendant and the government made arguments 
they did not make, that litigants in the Supreme Court made arguments 
they did not make, that the defendant and the government waived or 
forfeited arguments they did not waive or forfeit, that the Supreme Court 
said things it did not say, and that several of the defendant’s sentences 
had expired when they had not expired. 
This Memoir notes that Judge Easterbrook’s appearance on the panel 
that heard Ryan’s appeal was not the result of random assignment.  It 
shows that the government played no part in producing his falsehoods.  It 
describes his bullying of counsel on both sides and urges his colleagues to 
recognize the problem his conduct poses for their court. 
II.  THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER:  TWO VIEWS OF JUDGE EASTERBROOK 
Judge Frank Easterbrook’s reputation is a paradox.  Widely praised 
by legal academics, he is often disparaged by the lawyers who practice 
before him.  Legal scholars have written that there are only two 
“superstars” among active American judges not on the Supreme Court—
Easterbrook and his colleague on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, Richard Posner.1  Two of these scholars ranked 
Easterbrook and Posner with the late Henry Friendly and Learned Hand, 
declaring that these judges’ opinions “dominate and define the legal 
‘canon.’”2  With Justice Scalia in attendance, Judge Easterbrook recently 
gave the first Scalia Lecture at the Harvard Law School.3  When 
                                                 
1 See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An 
Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 74 (2004); Mitu Gulati & Veronica 
Sanchez, Giants in a World of Pygmies? Testing the Superstar Hypothesis with Judicial Opinions in 
Casebooks, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1141, 1143 (2002); Margaret V. Sachs, Superstar Judges as 
Entrepreneurs:  The Untold Story of Fraud-on-the-Market, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1207, 1211 (2015) 
(“Within the ranks of sitting federal circuit judges, Frank Easterbrook and Richard Posner 
stand out as the ‘superstars’ in multiple respects.”). 
2 Gulati & Sanchez, supra note 1, at 1143. 
3 Lana Birbrair, Judge Easterbrook Delivers Inaugural Scalia Lecture:  Interpreting the 
Unwritten Constitution, HARVARD LAW TODAY (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://today.law.harvard.edu/judge-easterbrook-delivers-inaugural-scalia-lecture-
interpreting-unwritten-constitution-video/ [http://perma.cc/9AY5-S2DB]. 
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Swarthmore awarded him an honorary degree in 2012, the college’s 
president proclaimed, “[Y]our wise leadership of the seventh-circuit 
Court of Appeals has made you one of the nation’s most influential and 
respected judges.”4  The Wikipedia entry about Judge Easterbrook notes 
that one University of Chicago lecturer referred to him as “the world’s 
greatest living jurist.”5 
The only bar association evaluation ever conducted of Seventh Circuit 
judges is now getting old.6  It occurred in 1994 when Judge Easterbrook 
had been on the bench for nine years.7  This evaluation by the Chicago 
Council of Lawyers criticized Judge Easterbrook more severely than any 
other judge on the court.8  Although the report praised his intelligence, 
breadth of knowledge, writing style, and work ethic, it faulted his 
treatment of lawyers, his willingness to decide cases on grounds not 
addressed by the parties, and his misstatements of law and fact. 
On the first point (mistreatment of lawyers), the Council declared that 
Judge Easterbrook “has consistently displayed a temperament that is 
improper for a circuit judge.”9  It noted: 
Lawyers reported that Judge Easterbrook goes well 
beyond asking pointed questions; rather, he "attacks" 
lawyers in an attempt to establish that the advocate has 
not understood the case or that the judge's knowledge is 
superior to that of the advocate.  Such behavior often 
continues well after the judge has made his point; Judge 
Easterbrook has gone so far as to cause attorneys to break 
down, unable to continue effectively.10 
                                                 
4 Easterbrook Awarded Honorary Degree by Swarthmore College, U. OF CHICAGO NEWS (June 
4, 2012), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/easterbrook-awarded-honorary-degree-
swarthmore-college [http://perma.cc/S3HM-LRP4]. 
5 Frank H. Easterbrook, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_H._ 
Easterbrook [https://perma.cc/9YG6-ZNSL] [hereinafter Easterbrook, WIKIPEDIA]. 
6 See Chicago Council of Lawyers, Evaluation of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 673 (1994). 
7 See id. at 747. 
8 The Council saw “no point in rating judges with life tenure” in the same way it rated 
candidates for the bench.  It offered “only a narrative description of their performance.”  Id. 
at 676.  On my reading, however, the Council viewed twelve of the fifteen judges it evaluated 
positively and most of these judges very positively.  It sharply criticized only three—Judges 
Coffee, Posner, and Easterbrook.  The Council’s criticism of Judge Easterbrook was more 
severe than that it offered of Judges Coffee and Posner. 
9 Id. at 760. 
10 Id. 
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Lawyers described Easterbrook as “arrogant and intolerant”11 and 
contended that he “displays a contempt for attorneys and, to some extent, 
the litigants as well.”12  Lawyers said that they “rarely feel like they have 
received a fair hearing.”13  Complaints about the judge’s demeanor were 
“resounding”14 and “consistent,”15 proceeding even from attorneys who 
praised other aspects of his work.16 
On the second point (disregard of the parties’ presentations), the 
Council noted, “Judge Easterbrook is one of the court’s chief practitioners 
of deciding issues that have not been briefed by the parties.”17  His dicta 
are “extensive and free-wheeling,” and he invokes them as authority in 
later decisions.18 
On the third point (misrepresenting facts and law), attorneys 
described Judge Easterbrook’s use of precedent as “unreliable and 
inappropriate.”19  They also claimed that he “mischaracteriz[es] the record 
below in order to reach certain results.”20  Judge Easterbrook “can 
communicate a lack of respect for the facts of a case and for precedent.”21  
The Council concluded, “[P]articularly when he disregards the facts or the 
law, [Judge Easterbrook] acts like the worst of judges.”22 
My sense is that Judge Easterbrook’s reputation among practitioners 
is no better today than it was in 1994.  A blogger still insists that 
Easterbrook “makes advocates appearing before him wet themselves in 
fear.”23  The judge himself told an interviewer in 2013 that he has in his 
chambers “a little political cartoonish thing that was given to me by my 
law clerks that has me, on the bench, pressing ‘the button,’ which I 
sometimes use metaphorically, that opens a trapdoor under the lawyer, 
                                                 
11 Id. 
12 Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 6, at 747. 
13 Id. at 760. 
14 Id. at 747. 
15 Id. at 709. 
16 Id. at 760. 
17 Id. at 756. 
18 Chicago Council of Lawyers, supra note 6, at 758. 
19 Id. at 757. 
20 Id. at 758. 
21 Id. at 747. 
22 Id. at 761.  See also Anthony D’Amato, The Ultimate Injustice:  When a Court Misstates the 
Facts, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1313, 1325–47 (1990) (complaining that Judge Easterbrook 
repeatedly misrepresented the record in Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
23 David Lat, Star Witnesses:  Judges Posner, Easterbrook and Bauer Testify Against Hal Turner, 
ABOVE THE LAW (Mar. 3, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/03/star-witnesses-
judges-posner-easterbrook-and-bauer-testify-against-hal-turner/ [http://perma.cc/X9V9-
SDHW]. 
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and shooting a lawyer down the 27 floors . . . . ”24 As this Memoir will 
show, the characteristics that prompted the bar’s criticism of Judge 
Easterbrook—his disdain for lawyers, for the principle of party 
presentation, and for truth telling—have not abated. 
Efforts to explain why academics and practitioners view Judge 
Easterbrook differently may suggest that the two groups have different 
outlooks.25  My guess, however, is that the values of the two groups do 
not differ much or explain much.  More significant is the fact that some 
lawyers feel the sting of Judge Easterbrook’s abuse personally.  Even when 
academics are aware of Judge Easterbrook’s conduct on the bench and 
have reservations about it, they can imagine that it reflects the judge’s 
unwillingness to suffer fools gladly. 
The principal reason for the differing perceptions of practitioners and 
academics may be neither differing outlooks nor differing personal 
experiences.  It may be instead that practitioners know things academics 
do not know.  An academic who is impressed by an engaging, well-
written opinion cannot easily determine whether this opinion 
misrepresents the record of the case before the court or the arguments of 
counsel.  He is also unlikely to know whether the opinion falsifies 
precedent.  Most cases cited by a court of appeals are unfamiliar to most 
academic readers, although they are usually well known to the lawyers 
who filed the briefs. 
This Memoir will dissect two opinions by Judge Easterbrook that on 
first reading might strike you as convincing and nicely done.26  It will tell 
the story of my representation of George H. Ryan, a former Illinois 
governor serving a sentence for mail fraud who sought a new trial 
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Skilling v. United States.27  The 
Memoir will describe six rulings in favor of the government set forth in 
Judge Easterbrook’s opinions although the government had not sought 
them.  Violating standards articulated by the Supreme Court, the Seventh 
Circuit gave Ryan no opportunity to address several of these rulings until 
after the opinions had been published.  I hope to convince you that the 
government had good reason for not endorsing these rulings; all of them 
were preposterous. 
This Memoir will also describe eight falsehoods told by Judge 
Easterbrook in written opinions and in statements from the bench. By 
                                                 
24 Interviews with United States Court of Appeals Judges:  Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, 5 SCRIBES 
J. LEGAL WRITING 1, 1 (2013). 
25 The practitioners’ explanations may imply that professors are pedants, and the 
professors’ may imply that practitioners are plumbers. 
26 See Ryan v. United States, 688 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012); Ryan v. United States, 645 F.3d 
913 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012). 
27 561 U.S. 358 (2010). 
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falsehoods, I do not mean minor misunderstandings or 
misinterpretations; I mean whoppers.  Anyone who checks can confirm that 
these statements were false, and I encourage skeptical readers to check.  
This Memoir will also describe Judge Easterbrook’s abusive demeanor on 
the bench. 
For the most part, my narrative will proceed chronologically, but I will 
take Falsehood Number Seven out of order and tell you about it now.  I offer 
this example out of order (1) so that you can see what I’m talking about 
and (2) so that I can discuss at the outset whether the judge’s 
misrepresentations should be regarded as innocent, negligent, grossly 
negligent, reckless, or deliberate.  Describing this falsehood will inform 
you not only about one of Judge Easterbrook’s misstatements of the record 
but also about one of the legal rulings he concocted—a ruling Ryan had 
no opportunity to address until he filed a petition for rehearing. 
The misrepresentation I am about to describe appeared in Judge 
Easterbrook’s second opinion in the Ryan case.  By the time of this opinion, 
it was clear that the instructions given to the jury at Ryan’s trial were 
flawed.  These instructions marked several paths to conviction.  They told 
the jury to convict if Ryan failed to disclose a conflict of interest, if he 
violated any of a number of state laws, or if he accepted bribes.  After 
Ryan’s conviction, the Supreme Court held in Skilling that failing to 
disclose a conflict of interest is no crime and that state-law violations do 
not establish the federal crime of depriving the public of its right to honest 
services.  The statute that Ryan allegedly violated outlawed only schemes 
to give or receive bribes or kickbacks.28 
The erroneous jury instructions did not automatically entitle Ryan to 
a new trial.  The error would be harmless if the jury found that Ryan had 
in fact accepted bribes.  Judge Easterbrook’s opinion for the Seventh 
Circuit concluded that the jury must have found bribery, and it offered 
three reasons for this conclusion.  The first one was: 
Ryan was convicted on four tax counts, which involved 
omitting income from tax returns.  Bribes are “income” 
under the Internal Revenue Code; gifts from friends are 
not income.  The jury was so instructed.  The jury also was 
told that it should acquit Ryan if he believed that the 
money he received was a gift, rather than a payment for 
favors delivered in return, even if his belief was wrong.  
By convicting on the tax counts, the jury found that Ryan 
knowingly accepted payment in exchange for official 
                                                 
28 See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 411–12. 
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acts—that he was bribed, rather than just that he failed to 
disclose gifts to the public.29 
That reads well, don’t you think?  It seems entirely convincing.  But 
every statement is a fabrication.  The government never claimed that Ryan 
failed to pay taxes on the payments it alleged were bribes.  Ryan was 
indeed convicted of tax violations, but they concerned other payments 
entirely.  The alleged bribes had nothing to do with the tax counts.  When 
Judge Easterbrook noted that bribes are income and gifts are not and then 
declared, “The jury was so instructed,” he made it up.  No instruction 
resembling the instruction he described had been given.  When Judge 
Easterbrook added that the jury was told to acquit if Ryan mistakenly 
believed the money he received was a gift rather than payment for services 
rendered, he again deceived his readers.30 
The government had not misled Judge Easterbrook.  It had not 
claimed that Ryan’s tax convictions bore on whether the jury found that 
he took bribes. 
Judge Easterbrook’s misrepresentation was especially astonishing 
because this was not the first time he had made it, and my co-counsel and 
I had complained to him and his colleagues about his earlier fabrication.  
In his first Ryan opinion, he wrote: 
The record shows . . . that [Ryan] received substantial 
payments from private parties during his years as 
Secretary of State and Governor.  The failure to report and 
pay tax on this income underlies the tax convictions.  The 
debate at trial on the racketeering and mail-fraud charges 
was whether these payments were campaign 
contributions, plus gifts from friends and well-wishers, or 
were instead bribes . . . .31 
This statement had no bearing on the issues Judge Easterbrook 
discussed in his first Ryan opinion.  My co-counsel and I nevertheless 
decided to note its falsity in our petition for rehearing en banc, hoping 
(foolishly) that underlining the judge’s penchant for confabulation would 
make his colleagues more attentive to other, more consequential 
misstatements.  Quoting the passage recited above, we wrote, “The panel 
                                                 
29 See Ryan, 688 F.3d at 849–50. 
30 See Trial Transcript at 22922–27 (Mar. 10, 2006), United States v. Warner (N.D. Ill. 2006) 
(No. 02 CR 505) (the trial court’s tax instructions).  A full transcript of the instructions in 
Ryan’s case is available from the author. 
31 Ryan v. United States, 645 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 
2099 (2012). 
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exhibited as little regard for the facts as it did for the law.”32  We then 
explained: 
In fact, the tax charges focused on Ryan’s alleged use of 
campaign funds for personal expenses (a use that was 
lawful but that constituted income), his receipt of a 
consulting fee from the Phil Gramm presidential 
campaign, and a few other alleged payments . . . .  None 
of these payments were alleged to be bribes.  All of the 
mail fraud charges of which Ryan remains convicted 
concern benefits he and others (mostly others) received 
from Lawrence Warner and Harry Klein. . . .  Only these 
benefits are now alleged to be bribes, and none played 
any part in the tax charges.33 
If someone accused you of falsifying facts in a document circulated to 
your co-workers, you might feel chagrined (especially if the accusation 
was accurate), but you are not Judge Easterbrook.  When Ryan’s case 
returned to him a year later, he concocted the same nonsense.  Judge 
Easterbrook probably had forgotten the correction, if he ever noticed it, 
and this time his misstatement constituted the court’s leading argument 
on the central issue in the case.  Our petition for rehearing following the 
second opinion complained about this misstatement and others,34 but the 
court denied the petition without correcting any of its errors. 
What could Judge Easterbrook have been thinking?  The most 
charitable and most likely explanation is that, because Ryan had not 
challenged his tax convictions after Skilling, Judge Easterbrook knew 
nothing at all about the tax charges.  Without bothering to check, he 
imagined that these charges concerned the payments alleged to be bribes, 
and, again without checking, he guessed what jury instructions the court 
would have given if the charges had concerned these payments. 
On these assumptions, I consider the word “falsehood” appropriate.  
Judge Easterbrook did not write:  “Here’s my guess,” or “Here’s what I 
think probably happened.”  An appellate judge is in a position to know 
what charges have been filed and what instructions have been given, and 
a tentative or qualified statement concerning these facts would have 
tipped readers off that something was amiss.  So Judge Easterbrook made 
                                                 
32 Ryan’s Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion of Rehearing En Banc at 5, Ryan v. 
United States, 645 F.3d 918 (7th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-3964), vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2099 
(2012). 
33 Id. 
34 See Ryan’s Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion of Rehearing En Banc at 5–9, Ryan v. 
United States, 688 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-3964). 
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the sort of firm pronouncement one expects in a judicial opinion.  This 
pronouncement would have led readers to believe he had examined the 
record himself or else had relied on a party’s uncontested description of 
this record.  By offering an unqualified statement when he knew he was 
guessing, Judge Easterbrook deliberately deceived his readers. 
Perhaps, on the assumption I’ve made about his mental state, one 
could characterize Judge Easterbrook’s misstatements as reckless rather 
than purposeful.35  If one is extremely charitable, one might even call these 
misstatements grossly negligent rather than reckless.36  Whatever the 
appropriate label might be, this Memoir will show that Judge Easterbrook 
persistently presents wildly inaccurate, made-up statements as 
unquestionable statements of fact.37 
The Wikipedia entry about Judge Easterbrook mentions the Chicago 
Council of Lawyers’ criticism of his demeanor, but it observes that “the 
Council did not specify authorship, so the criticism is anonymous.”38  The 
entry adds: 
[T]his review by the Council was never repeated, lending 
partial support to the defenders of Easterbrook and 
Posner that the report was an opportunity for anonymous 
venting by lawyers who were unhappy with the results 
of Seventh Circuit decisions, in no small part thanks to the 
decisions of Reagan appointees Easterbrook and Posner.  
Posner has recently commented about the report, “You 
have here some anonymous people who are talking to the 
Chicago Council of Lawyers.  How much credence 
should we put on these people?  They can be sore losers.  
They can be crybabies.”39 
                                                 
35 Judge Easterbrook probably did not know when he insisted that certain jury instructions 
had been given that they had not been given.  He probably imagined that they had been.  If 
believing that a made-up statement is likely to be true makes a charge of lying inappropriate, 
you might prefer a different word—perhaps “confabulating.”  Cf.  New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (declaring that a reckless disregard for the truth can 
qualify as “actual malice”). 
36 Cf.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) (defining 
recklessness and criminal negligence).  If Judge Easterbrook failed even to advert to the 
possibility that his guesses might be wrong, one could plausibly describe him as grossly 
negligent.  If he realized that his guesses might be wrong and nevertheless offered them as 
fact, “reckless” would be a better word. 
37 Even if one were to characterize Judge Easterbrook’s misstatements as grossly negligent 
at the time he made them, these misstatements would have become something worse when 
he left them uncorrected after lawyers noted them in petitions for rehearing. 
38 Easterbrook, WIKIPEDIA, supra note 5. 
39 Id. 
16 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
Because a judge must pick a winner and a loser in every case, the lawyers 
who criticized Judge Easterbrook probably had lost as many cases before 
the judges they praised as they had before him.  They evidently did not 
cry whenever they lost.  Eight of the fifteen judges they evaluated had 
been appointed by President Reagan, and the lawyers reviewed most of 
these judges favorably.  The reason these critics remained anonymous was 
apparent:  they suspected that revealing their identities would lead to 
unprovable retaliation against them and their clients. 
I am in a different position from these critics.  I have retired, and I can 
be sure that I will never again appear before the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.  I can afford to say out loud what 
practicing lawyers can only whisper.  To the charge of being a sore loser 
and a crybaby, I plead guilty.  I think that lawyers should be sore losers 
and whiners when judges cheat. 
III.  THE GOALS OF THIS MEMOIR AND HOW IT WILL PROCEED 
This Memoir may contribute to the study of judicial reputation by 
showing how a judge whose reputation in the academy is ace-high can in 
fact be a terrible judge.  The Memoir also will draw some general lessons 
about fair procedure in an adversary system, and it will propose some 
reforms.  My main purpose, however, is not to contribute to the study of 
judicial reputation, to draw general lessons about the adversary system, 
or to propose institutional reforms.  It is to tell the truth about Judge 
Easterbrook. 
I have several reasons for complaining publicly about this judge’s 
conduct.  First, I hope that this Memoir will bring a pardon closer for 
George Ryan.  Ryan deserves a pardon, not because he’s a saint, but 
because his government has treated him badly.  Senator Dick Durbin 
encouraged President Bush to release Ryan from prison after he had been 
there less than a year,40 and the case for clemency is much stronger now.  
Ryan is eighty-one, and he’s completed his sentence.  As this Memoir will 
show, he was almost certainly punished for conduct that is not a crime.  
In my fantasy world, Judge Easterbrook himself might recognize that 
his work in Ryan’s case was imperfect, and he might write the President 
to support a pardon.  The judges who joined Judge Easterbrook’s 
opinions, Judges Diane Wood and John Tinder, might join him or else 
write letters of their own.  But I know that the odds of such judicial 
redemption in the real world are probably negligible. 
                                                 
40 See Durbin to Ask Bush to Commute Ryan Sentence, HUFF. POST (May 25, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/12/01/durbin-to-ask-bush-to-com_n_147485.html 
[http://perma.cc/6ZMW-XCZX]. 
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Even if a pardon for Ryan is a pipe dream, this Memoir may lead 
Judge Easterbrook to hesitate before making up law, facts, and grounds of 
decision that no one else has imagined.  At a minimum, it may prompt 
him to check some citations. 
Most importantly, I hope that this Memoir will encourage Judge 
Easterbrook’s colleagues to rein him in.  Like almost everyone else, these 
colleagues sometimes seem intimidated by Judge Easterbrook’s personal 
forcefulness and apparent intellectual power.  When the judge speaks 
with confidence and an apparent mastery of detail about a subject one 
knows nothing about, one is likely to assume that he knows what he’s 
talking about.  The odds, however, are that he doesn’t.  If questioned or 
challenged, he is likely to double down and push his bluff farther (“Right.  
I understand that.  That’s what the D.C. Circuit held in Frady and which 
the Supreme Court reversed.”41), but the questioner should not yield.  
Judge Easterbrook’s colleagues should view everything he says with 
skepticism and should recognize the serious problem his conduct poses 
for their court. 
Even if this Memoir produces no change in Judge Easterbrook’s 
behavior or the performance of his court, the taxpayers who pay Judge 
Easterbrook’s salary should know the kind of service he provides in 
return.  Although the Constitution guarantees an Article III judge life 
tenure,42 it is instructive to consider how falsehoods like his would fare in 
professions other than his.  Would a journalist who made similar 
misstatements keep his job?  Would an academic who showed no greater 
regard for the truth get tenure?  Would a corporate executive who 
misstated crucial facts in a business report be given a second chance? 
Before I review Judge Easterbrook’s conduct, I will describe the 
principal crime with which Ryan was charged and the course his case took 
before it reached Judge Easterbrook.  This Memoir will proceed for twenty 
pages before Judge Easterbrook appears at center stage again, but it would 
be difficult to compress into less space a case that began with a 114–page 
indictment and continued through a six-month trial, eighteen days of 
troubled jury deliberations, a Seventh Circuit decision that led three 
judges to dissent from the court’s denial of rehearing en banc, a 
transformation of the applicable law by the Supreme Court after Ryan 
began serving his sentence, and a post-conviction proceeding that 
generated a fifty-eight page opinion in the district court. 
                                                 
41 See Oral Argument at 3:19, Ryan v. United States, 688 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-
3964), vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012), http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/ 
2011/migrated.orig.10-3964_05_31_2011.mp3 [http://perma.cc/S247-27LF]. 
42 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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This Memoir will note Judge Easterbrook’s unexpected appearance on 
the panel that decided Ryan’s post-Skilling appeal—an appearance that 
was not the product of random assignment.  It will describe an oral 
argument that consisted in large part of Judge Easterbrook’s demand that 
counsel discuss four Supreme Court decisions that neither party had cited 
and that I, at least, could not recall. 
Judge Easterbrook declared that these decisions precluded Ryan from 
challenging in post-conviction proceedings the instructions that had 
directed his conviction for non-criminal conduct.  In fact, none of the 
decisions offered any support for this proposition; they bore no 
resemblance to his description.  In dozens of cases, the Supreme Court, the 
Seventh Circuit, and other courts have allowed post-conviction challenges 
to instructions directing conviction for non-criminal conduct. 
Judge Easterbrook similarly browbeat the government’s lawyer at 
argument for failing to notice that Ryan’s post-conviction petition was 
barred by the statute of limitations.  He evidently overlooked a Seventh 
Circuit decision holding that petitions like Ryan’s are not barred.  That 
decision was directly on point, and its author was Judge Easterbrook. 
After recounting the argument in Ryan’s case, this Memoir will 
describe Judge Easterbrook’s first opinion.  This opinion offered a ground 
of decision that not only had not been advanced by the government but 
that no judge had mentioned at argument.  Judge Easterbrook declared 
that Ryan had forfeited his objections to the undisclosed-conflicts 
instruction and the other instructions directing his conviction for non-
criminal conduct.  He did not mention that Ryan had objected to these 
instructions at every stage of the proceedings.  He also did not mention 
the government’s express waiver of any claim that Ryan had forfeited his 
objections. 
As we pointed out at the earliest opportunity (in our petition for 
rehearing), disregarding the government’s express waiver was unlawful, 
but the court did not correct its error.  In an effort to distinguish Ryan’s 
case from Skilling and another case decided the same day, Black v. United 
States,43 Judge Easterbrook made a series of statements about how the 
defendants in Skilling and Black had preserved their claims.  Like most of 
what Judge Easterbrook said in his initial opinion, these statements had 
no element of truth. 
The Supreme Court vacated Judge Easterbrook and his colleagues’ 
first Ryan decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of 
Wood v. Milyard.44  In Wood, the Supreme Court declared once again that 
                                                 
43 561 U.S. 465 (2010). 
44 Ryan v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012) (remanding for reconsideration in light of 
Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826 (2012)). 
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an appellate court may not disregard the government’s waiver of a 
procedural defense.  In his opinion on remand, however, Judge 
Easterbrook did not acknowledge his improper disregard of the 
government’s concession that Ryan had made appropriate objections to 
the district court’s instructions.  Instead, he falsely attributed to the 
government a sweeping waiver it had not made. 
Judge Easterbrook’s second opinion announced that the court would 
refuse to review four of Ryan’s mail fraud convictions at all (convictions 
that at least one member of the panel apparently was unwilling to affirm).  
Again, Ryan was afforded no opportunity to address the court’s ruling 
until after it was made; neither the government nor any judge at either of 
the two arguments in Ryan’s case had indicated that the court might 
refuse to review his convictions.  Judge Easterbrook justified his refusal to 
review the four convictions by declaring that Ryan’s sentences on these 
convictions had expired, but they had not expired.  Even if they had, none 
of the three doctrines Judge Easterbrook mentioned would have supplied 
even arguable justification for refusing to review his convictions. 
Because the court agreed to review three other mail fraud convictions, 
Judge Easterbrook turned at last to the question the parties had briefed in 
the Seventh Circuit more than a year before—the question of harmless 
error.  In addressing this question, however, Judge Easterbrook once more 
disregarded the parties’ arguments and confronted Ryan with a ruling 
that the government had not sought and that neither Judge Easterbrook 
nor any other judge had mentioned at argument.  This Memoir already 
has noted his ruling that, by convicting on the tax counts, the jury must 
have found that Ryan took bribes.  Judge Easterbrook set forth two 
additional reasons for judging the instructional errors in Ryan’s case 
harmless, but in presenting these reasons, he continued to misstate the 
record. 
Unless you represent prisoners or the government in post-conviction 
proceedings, this Memoir is likely to teach you lots of law you don’t know.  
You will learn about direct review, collateral review, § 2255, waiver, 
forfeiture, harmless error, plain error, cause and prejudice, retroactivity, 
mootness, vested good time, the custody requirement, the concurrent 
sentence doctrine, and the different statutes of limitations that apply to 
first and second post-conviction petitions.  In other words, this Memoir 
will inundate you with “lawyers’ law,” defined as “law of no interest to 
anyone but lawyers.”  Even if you are a lawyer, you may find some of this 
law challenging.  Challenging law provides the best opportunity for 
judicial flimflam.  Examining Judge Easterbrook’s falsehoods about such 
things as whether one party waived or forfeited another party’s waiver or 
forfeiture can get tedious, but, in criticizing the performance of a widely 
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respected judge, I think it prudent to be thorough and to leave as little as 
possible to rebuttal.  This Memoir will quote at length from Judge 
Easterbrook’s opinions and from the oral argument in Ryan’s case, and it 
will describe in some detail the precedents Judge Easterbrook falsified. 
The Memoir will conclude by arguing for two propositions:  (1) that a 
judge should never rest a decision in whole or in part on a ground the 
parties have had no prior opportunity to address and (2) that whenever a 
judge learns before his court issues its mandate that an opinion he has 
joined contains a clear error, he should act to correct this error.  He should 
do so even if the error does not seem outcome-determinative or important. 
IV.  THE PROSECUTION AND CONVICTION OF GEORGE RYAN 
At the end of a six-month trial, a federal jury convicted George Ryan 
of tax violations, false statements to the F.B.I., mail fraud, and 
racketeering.45  The racketeering conviction depended on the mail fraud 
convictions; if they fell, it would too.  In the proceedings that came before 
Judge Easterbrook, we did not challenge Ryan’s tax and false statement 
convictions but focused on the racketeering and mail fraud charges. 
A. The “Intangible Right of Honest Services” 
Honest services fraud is a type of mail fraud.  The mail fraud statute 
forbids devising any scheme to defraud and then placing something in the 
mail for the purpose of executing the scheme.46  This statute, enacted in 
1872, was aimed, not at dishonest government officials, but at swindlers 
who used the mails to peddle things like phony western mining stock.47 
                                                 
45 Apart from his legal troubles, Ryan is best remembered for declaring a death penalty 
moratorium in 2000 and then emptying Illinois’ death row in 2003.  He pardoned four death-
row inmates on grounds of innocence and commuted the sentences of 167 others. Before 
Ryan became Governor, he had been Secretary of State, Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of the 
Illinois House of Representatives, a five-term member of the House, and Chair of the 
Kankakee County Board.  Altogether Ryan held elective office for thirty-six years and 
statewide elective office for twenty.  He never lost an election and was the longest serving 
elected official in Illinois history.  See JAMES L. MERRINER, THE MAN WHO EMPTIED DEATH 
ROW:  GOVERNOR GEORGE RYAN AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME 1, 7 (2008); Illinois Governor 
George H. Ryan, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, http://www.nga.org/cms/home/governors/ 
past-governors-bios/page_illinois/col2-content/main-content-list/title_ryan_george.html 
[http://perma.cc/JRT6-P8FX]. 
46 See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). 
47 The sponsor of the statute declared that it would “prevent the frauds which are mostly 
gotten up in the large cities . . . by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the purpose 
of deceiving and fleecing the innocent people in the country.”  See McNally v. United States, 
483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870) (remarks of 
Rep. Farnsworth)). 
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Federal prosecutors pressed courts to stretch the statute, and, 
particularly in the 1970s, they did.  By 1987, nearly every federal court of 
appeals held that the statute outlawed deprivations of the intangible right 
of honest services.48  In 1987, however, the Supreme Court held in McNally 
v. United States49 that the statute outlawed only deprivations of property, 
not of an ill-defined intangible right to honest services.  
Defendants who had been convicted of mail fraud in the years before 
McNally then sought post-conviction relief.  They noted that the juries that 
convicted them had been directed to convict on the basis of conduct that 
was not a crime.  The prosecutors who had pleaded for honest-services 
instructions before McNally then maintained that the erroneous 
instructions had made no difference.  In almost every case, they argued 
that it would have been impossible to deprive the alleged victim of honest 
services without also depriving this person of property.50 
While the Justice Department argued to the courts that honest-
services instructions made no difference, it complained to Congress that 
McNally had deprived it of an important tool in its fight against 
government corruption.51  Congress promptly responded by enacting a 
new section of the mail fraud statute that read in full, “For the purposes 
of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme 
or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”52  
The federal courts of appeals rejected arguments that this statute was 
unconstitutionally vague.53  They agreed that accepting a bribe or 
kickback deprived the public of its right to honest services, and they said 
that other things did too.  As the Supreme Court later observed in Skilling, 
however, the courts were in “considerable disarray” about what the other 
things were.54 
                                                 
48 See id. at 362–64 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
49 480 U.S. 350 (1987). 
50 Examples include United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1073–74 (4th Cir. 1988), in 
which the Fourth Circuit set aside the conviction of a former governor of Maryland because 
the court could not say “‘with a high degree of probability’ that the jury did not rely on the 
legally incorrect theory” and Messinger v. United States, 872 F.2d 217, 221 (7th Cir. 1989), in 
which the Seventh Circuit concluded that “the jury necessarily had to convict Messinger for 
defrauding Cook County of its property right . . . notwithstanding any intangible rights 
theory employed.” 
51 See Mail Fraud:  Hearing on H.R. 3089 and H.R. 3050 Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Just. of 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 8–11 (1988) (statement of John C. Keeney, Acting 
Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Crim. Division of the Dep’t of Just.). 
52 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012). 
53 See, e.g., United States v. Hausmann, 345 F.3d 952, 958 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Gray, 96 F.3d 769, 776–77 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 941 (4th Cir. 
1995). 
54 See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 405 (2010). 
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An opinion by Judge Easterbrook supplied the Seventh Circuit’s basic 
standard.  He wrote in United States v. Bloom,55 “An employee deprives his 
employer of his honest services only if he misuses his position (or the 
information he obtained in it) for personal gain.”56 
Judge Easterbrook might have regarded Bloom’s “personal gain” 
requirement as a significant limitation, but a doctrine that would allow a 
dishonest employee to avoid conviction by saying, “Please pay the money 
to my sister,” could not last long.  After Bloom, the Seventh Circuit 
changed the operative word from “personal” to “private.”57  It explained, 
“By ‘private gain’ we simply mean illegitimate gain, which usually will go 
to the defendant, but need not.”58  In Ryan, an instruction told the jury to 
convict if the defendant “misus[ed] his official position . . . for private gain 
for himself or another.”59  It thus directed conviction if Ryan misused his 
official position to benefit any friend or political supporter.  The Bloom 
standard found no favor outside the Seventh Circuit.60 
The First Circuit took an especially expansive view of honest services 
fraud, one that the government successfully urged the district court to 
approve in Ryan’s case.  In United States v. Woodward61 and United States v. 
Sawyer,62 the First Circuit upheld the convictions of a legislator and a 
lobbyist who had lavishly entertained him.  The well-entertained 
legislator had supported almost all of the lobbyist’s agenda.  The court 
explained: 
A public official has an affirmative duty to disclose 
material information to the public employer . . . .  When 
an official fails to disclose a personal interest in a matter 
over which she has decision-making power, the public is 
deprived of its right either to disinterested decision 
                                                 
55 149 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 1998). 
56 Id. at 656–57. 
57 See United States v. Sorich, 523 F.3d 702, 707–08 (7th Cir. 2008). 
58 Id. at 709. 
59 See Separate App’x of Pet’r-Appellant, Vol. 2 at A-000421, Ryan v. United States, 645 
F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-3964), vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012) (transcript 
of jury instructions). 
60 See, e.g., United States v. Inzuna, 638 F.3d 1006, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2009) (declining to 
follow Bloom); United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1107 (10th Cir. 2003) (declining “to 
become the first court [outside the Seventh Circuit] to embrace Bloom’s pleading 
requirements”); United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 691–93 (3d Cir. 2001) (complaining 
that Judge Easterbrook’s opinion falsely described Seventh Circuit precedent and substituted 
one ambiguous standard for another). 
61 149 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 1998). 
62 85 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 1996). 
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making itself or, as the case may be, to full disclosure as 
to the official's potential motivation . . . .63 
The court acknowledged that the entertainment it criminalized “may not 
be very different, except in degree, from routine cultivation of friendship 
in a lobbying context.”64 
Punishing officials who have failed to disclose conflicts of interest 
may sound like a fine idea.  When an official makes a decision despite a 
conflict of interest, shouldn’t he at least make the conflict known?  But the 
idea’s appeal may fade as one examines it. 
The jury instructions in Ryan told the jury that it was unlawful for an 
official to fail to disclose “a material personal or financial interest, also 
known as a conflict of interest, in a matter over which he has decision-
making power,”65 and they defined materiality as having “the natural 
tendency to influence or [being] capable of influencing [a] decision.”66  
They thus defined a conflicting interest in the only way it can be defined—
as any interest that might divert an official from faithful service to the 
public. 
When a public official’s decision will benefit a member of his family, 
he has a conflict of interest.  When his decision will benefit a business 
partner or good friend, he again has a conflict.  When his decision will 
benefit an important political supporter, he has a conflict.  When his 
decision will benefit a lobbyist who has taken him on golf outings, he once 
more has a conflict.  When this official’s action will benefit anyone at all 
who has done any favor for which he is grateful, he has a conflict of 
interest.  Conflicts are ubiquitous.  Show me a public official without 
conflicts of interest, and I will show you an official without any social life, 
work life, family life, religious life, or political life. 
No official could compile a list of all his conflicts, and, if he could, he 
would not know where to post it.  How does one go about disclosing a 
conflict of interest to a disembodied public employer?  Would a “my 
conflicts” section on the official’s Facebook page be sufficient?  When no 
official ever has or ever could disclose every conflict, criminalizing 
undisclosed conflicts looks like a way to enable prosecutors to pick their 
targets.67  Campaign finance laws, gratuities prohibitions, and ethical 
                                                 
63 Id. at 724 (internal citation omitted). 
64 Woodward, 149 F.3d at 55. 
65 Separate App’x of Pet’r-Appellant, Vol. 2, supra note 59, at A-000420 (jury instructions). 
66 Id. 
67 Cf. United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 949–50 (9th Cir. 2009) (Berzon, J., 
concurring) (“The conflict of interest theory, unhinged from an external disclosure standard, 
places too potent a tool in the hands of zealous prosecutors who may be guided by their own 
political motivations . . . [and who] might also feel political pressure to pursue certain state 
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codes forbidding the creation of some conflicts of interest offer a better 
way of minimizing corruption.68  In Skilling, the Supreme Court would 
repudiate every lower court’s view of honest services fraud, but when 
George Ryan’s trial began on September 19, 2005, Skilling lay almost five 
years in the future. 
B. Indictment and Trial 
Prosecutors regard the mail fraud statute as “our Stradivarius, our 
Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart.”69  The trial of George Ryan 
shows why.  An early section of the indictment in Ryan’s case was headed 
“Laws, Duties, Policies and Procedures Applicable to Defendant 
RYAN.”70  None of the laws and policies listed in this section were federal 
laws. They included provisions of the Illinois Constitution, Illinois 
criminal laws, non-criminal state regulations, a policy memorandum of 
the Illinois Secretary of State’s office, and George Ryan’s announced 
personal policy of not accepting gifts worth more than $50.  An instruction 
in Ryan’s case declared that any violation of law by the defendant to 
produce private gain for himself or another established the central 
element of honest services fraud.71  Any law violation constituted the 
“misuse of office” required by Bloom.  As interpreted in the Seventh 
Circuit, the mail fraud statute thus transformed minor state 
misdemeanors and non-criminal regulatory violations into federal 
felonies. 
The indictment alleged a single scheme to defraud that began when 
Ryan was elected Secretary of State and ended when he left the Governor’s 
office twelve years later.72  One hundred twenty-eight numbered 
paragraphs set forth the scheme.  Paragraph after paragraph began with 
the words “[i]t was a further part of the scheme” and recited unattractive 
conduct.73  Ryan was said to have known that state facilities were being 
used for political purposes, to have been present when an associate told 
                                                 
or local officials.”).  Even when prosecutors are not partisan and are not subject to outside 
pressure, they are likely to view a governor in the same way a big game hunter views a cape 
buffalo. 
68 See ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA:  FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF 
BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 284–87 (2014); Albert W. Alschuler, Criminal Corruption:  Why Broad 
Definitions of Bribery Make Things Worse, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 484–85 (2015). 
69 Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 771 (1980). 
70 Separate App’x of Pet’r-Appellant, Vol. 1 at A-000068–71, Ryan v. United States, 645 
F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2011) (No.10-3964), vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012) (second 
superseding indictment). 
71 Id. at A-000421 (jury instructions). 
72 See id. at A-000075 (second superseding indictment). 
73  Id. 
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employees to “clean up” these facilities before an investigation, to have 
awarded low-digit license plates to campaign contributors, to have 
favored friends and benefactors in the award of government contracts, to 
have reassigned or dismissed employees investigating misconduct by 
drivers-license examiners, to have violated his personal pledge not to 
accept gifts worth more than $50, to have shared confidential information 
about the location of a new state prison with a friend who used this 
information to make a profit, and to have accepted a secret political 
consulting fee.  Some of Ryan’s alleged misconduct would have violated 
criminal or civil regulations, and some would not.74 
The trial judge rejected Ryan’s argument that the indictment alleged 
many schemes rather than one,75 and her judgment that everything done 
during Ryan’s time in office was part of one grand plot guided her in 
conducting the trial and receiving evidence.  For four and one-half months 
of a trial that lasted almost six months, the government presented 
evidence to support its allegations.76  Then, at the end of the trial, the judge 
held that proving all the alleged aspects of the grand scheme was 
unnecessary. 
Formally, the act forbidden by the mail fraud statute is mailing.  The 
Supreme Court has held that any mailing by anyone “incident to an 
essential part of the scheme” is sufficient.77  The mailer need not be the 
defendant or any of his confederates.78  Prosecutors generally can multiply 
the number of charges and convictions indefinitely.  After setting forth 
                                                 
74 This list of charges might affect you in the same way it might have affected the jury.  It 
might cause you to think poorly of George Ryan and make you care less about whether the 
courts treated him fairly.  As you continue to read this Memoir, however, notice how many 
of the charges fade away. The district court held the evidence insufficient to support two 
mail fraud charges.  See United States v. Warner, No. 02-CR-506, 2006 WL 2583722, at *12–13 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 2006).  The Seventh Circuit ultimately refused to review three more—
apparently because at least one member of the panel doubted they could be sustained.  The 
jury was not asked to make a yes-or-no judgment about most of the charges, and you will 
see how insubstantial the surviving charges are.  George Ryan probably did not banish from 
his thoughts and actions the impulse to aid friends and supporters, but there is little reason 
to believe he took bribes or sacrificed the public interest.  Of course George Ryan’s virtue or 
lack of it is irrelevant to the issues discussed in this Memoir.  Few Americans excuse or 
minimize police brutality because its victims were lawbreakers themselves, and this Memoir 
is about Judge Easterbrook, not Governor Ryan. 
75 See United States v. Warner, No. 02-CR-506, 2004 WL 1794476, at *21 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 
2004). 
76 The presentation of evidence by Ryan and his co-defendant took less than one month.  
The remainder of the trial consisted of closing argument, jury instructions, and jury 
deliberations. 
77 Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710–11 (1989). 
78 See id. at 707, 714–15 (holding that mailings by an unwitting car dealer were enough). 
26 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
one scheme to defraud, the indictment presented nine mail-fraud charges.  
Each of these charges alleged a mailing in furtherance of the scheme. 
Although every mailing charged in the indictment was alleged to 
have furthered the grand scheme, it also allegedly furthered a small part 
of this scheme.  One count concerned Ryan’s alleged sharing of 
confidential information concerning the new state prison.  Another 
concerned his approval of a state lease of property from Harry Klein, who 
had hosted Ryan and his wife during a number of one-week stays at 
Klein’s vacation home in Jamaica.  The other seven counts all concerned 
leases and contracts that benefited Ryan’s co-defendant Lawrence 
Warner.  Warner was a long-time family friend and political supporter 
who had done favors for Ryan and members of his family.  (I offer a list of 
Warner’s favors in a footnote.)79  The trial judge told the jury that finding 
any of these “included” schemes would be enough.  The issue would be 
whether some of the dirt thrown at the wall had stuck.80 
                                                 
79 Warner hosted two political fundraisers for Ryan, which raised $75,000 and $175,000.  
In McCormick v. United States, the Supreme Court held that campaign contributions may be 
treated as bribes only when “the payments are made in return for an explicit promise or 
undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act.”  500 U.S. 257, 273 
(1991).  The government did not claim that Ryan made an explicit promise to Warner, and 
none of its evidence suggested that he did.  But see United States v. Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729, 
735 (7th Cir. 2015) (Easterbrook, J.) (apparently rejecting the argument that McCormick 
requires an explicit quid pro quo while ignoring that decision’s explicit statement to the 
contrary).  Warner, an insurance adjuster, adjusted an insurance claim for free after Ryan’s 
apartment flooded on Christmas Day.  The two fundraisers and the insurance adjustment 
were the only benefits Warner provided to Ryan himself. 
 But Warner did several favors for people close to Ryan.  He adjusted an insurance claim 
for a Ryan son-in-law, shared lobbying fees with two people who were friends of Ryan, lent 
money to a business partly owned by Ryan’s brother, lent money to Ryan’s son’s cigar 
business, lent money to a Ryan son-in-law, and paid for the band at the wedding of one of 
Ryan’s daughters.  I believe I’ve now listed everything. 
 You can see why the government did not mention Warner’s supposed bribes in its tax 
charges.  See supra Part II.  If a friend adjusted an insurance claim for you, would you 
recognize the value of his services as income?  If he lent $6,000 to your son’s cigar business, 
would you pay income taxes on the loan?  If he gave your daughter a wedding present, 
would you report the value of the gift as income on your return? 
80 Here’s the relevant instruction.  See (a) whether you can make sense of it; and (b) 
whether you think my paraphrase is fair: 
Proof of several separate or independent schemes will not establish the 
single scheme alleged in Counts 2 through 10 unless one of the schemes 
which is proved is included within the single scheme alleged in those 
counts.  If, therefore, you find beyond a reasonable doubt that there 
were two or more schemes to defraud and that the defendant was a 
member of one or more of these schemes to defraud, and you further 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the proved scheme to defraud was 
included within the charged scheme to defraud, you should find that 
defendant guilty of the particular count you are considering, provided 
that all other elements of the mail fraud charge have been proved. 
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The indictment’s allegations concerning the use of state facilities for 
political purposes, the cover-up of their political use, the award of low-
digit license plates to contributors, the re-assignment of employees 
investigating misconduct by license examiners, and the receipt of a secret 
political consulting fee were not the subject of specific mail-fraud charges.  
The jury had no opportunity to render a yes-or-no verdict on any of these 
allegations. 
American courts ordinarily exclude “other acts” evidence.81  This 
evidence is rejected because jurors should not be tempted to convict the 
defendant for being a bad person; they should judge the accusation of a 
particular wrongful act at a particular time.82  In separate trials of the 
schemes alleged in the individual mail fraud counts, evidence of the other 
little schemes would have been inadmissible.  But evidence of the schemes 
on which the jury was not asked to render a verdict hovered over the jury’s 
deliberations.  By throwing a mass of charges of unattractive conduct into 
a churning cauldron, prosecutors invited jurors to judge Ryan’s character 
rather than his guilt or innocence of particular charges. 
C. Jury Deliberations, Verdict, and Appeal 
Despite a conflict of interest instruction broad enough to convict 
almost anyone and a cauldron of disparaging evidence, the jury in Ryan’s 
case had difficulty reaching a verdict.  After a week of deliberations, Juror 
Ezell sent the judge a note “complaining that other jurors were calling her 
derogatory names and shouting profanities.”83  The note was co-signed by 
the jury’s foreperson.  The judge responded by directing the jurors to treat 
each other with respect.84  Two days later, a note signed by eight jurors 
asked whether Ezell could be removed from the jury because she was 
refusing to engage in meaningful deliberation.  Again the judge advised 
the jurors to treat each other with respect.85 
                                                 
 
If, on the other hand, you find that there were two or more schemes to 
defraud and that the defendant was not a member of any proved scheme 
included within the charged scheme to defraud, you should find that 
defendant not guilty of that count. 
Separate App’x of Pet’r-Appellant, Vol. 2, supra note 59, at A-000419–20. 
81 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
82 See Edward J. Imwinkelreid, Undertaking the Task of Reforming the American Character 
Evidence Prohibition:  The Importance of Getting the Experiment Off on the Right Foot, 22 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 285, 289–92 (1994). 
83  See United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 675 (7th Cir. 2007). 
84 Id. 
85 See id. at 676. 
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Following Ryan’s conviction, Juror Peterson acknowledged that she 
had violated the court’s instructions by bringing a published article into 
the jury room and reading part of it aloud.  The article declared that any 
juror unwilling to “meaningfully deliberate” could be removed from the 
panel.86 
A few hours after the court’s second admonition of the need for 
respect, the Chicago Tribune reported to court officials that Juror Pavlick 
had given untruthful answers on his jury questionnaire by concealing two 
criminal convictions.  The judge halted the jury’s deliberations, conducted 
an investigation, and removed Pavlick from the panel.87 
Further investigation by the Tribune and the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
revealed that five other jurors and two alternates had given false 
responses on their questionnaires.  One alternate had not revealed a D.U.I. 
conviction; another alternate and three sitting jurors, including Ezell, had 
not revealed arrests; and two jurors had not revealed that they had filed 
for bankruptcy.88  After questioning the suspected jurors individually, the 
judge dismissed Ezell and the alternate who had not disclosed his D.U.I. 
conviction. The judge concluded that the information withheld by the 
other five would not have warranted their exclusion from the jury for 
cause if this information had been known before trial.89  No one was 
surprised when, after the reconstituted jury convicted Ryan, Ezell told the 
press that the result would have been different if she had remained on the 
panel.90 
The jury that convicted Ryan included four jurors who might have 
feared prosecution for making false statements to the government and for 
perjury.91  These jurors had been subjected to interrogation by the judge 
in the presence of the lawyers.  The judge said of one of the jurors who 
                                                 
86 See id. at 677–78. 
87 See id. at 681. 
88 See id. at 676. 
89 See Warner, 498 F.3d at 666–67, 684–85. 
90 See David Heinzmann & Richard Wronski, Different View, Different Result?:  
Disappointment and Frustration, CHI. TRIB. (April 18, 2006), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-04-18/news/0604180301_1_fellow-jurors-george-
ryan-jury [http://perma.cc/C8H5-4CNZ]. 
91 Before questioning the jurors, the trial judge asked counsel for their views on whether 
the jurors should be given the Miranda warnings.  The chief prosecutor then consulted the 
U.S. Attorney and reported that his office would not use against the jurors any statements 
they made during the judge’s interrogation.  The prosecutor did not, however, grant the 
jurors immunity from prosecution for the apparently false statements on their 
questionnaires, and the jurors were not advised of the limited immunity the prosecutor had 
afforded.  See Warner, 498 F.3d at 708–09 (Kanne, J., dissenting).  The jurors tried Ryan for an 
offense that several of them were suspected of committing themselves.  Moreover, the jurors’ 
statements, unlike Ryan’s, were made under oath so that their false answers could have been 
prosecuted as perjury.  See id. at 707. 
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remained on the panel, “Grilling Mr. Casino is one of the most distasteful 
things I have done in this job.”92  The jurors had seen a juror whom they 
knew to be pro-defense dismissed.  The reconstituted jury had two new 
members and ten who already had deliberated for eight days.  After the 
judge instructed them to disregard the prior deliberations and begin 
anew, they deliberated for ten days before convicting Ryan on all counts.93 
The trial judge set two of the jury’s mail fraud convictions aside.  One 
concerned a lease upon which Lawrence Warner had received a 
commission, and the judge wrote, “[T]here is no evidence that Ryan 
steered this contract to Warner.”94  The other vacated conviction 
concerned Ryan’s disclosure of confidential information about the new 
state prison to a friend.  The judge concluded that the government’s 
evidence was “equally consistent with the inference that the disclosure 
was inadvertent as it is with the inference that it was purposeful.”95 
The jurors’ conviction on counts for which the evidence was weak or 
nonexistent suggested that they might not have carefully analyzed the 
mail fraud charges one-by-one.  The statements of some jurors and the 
prosecutor reinforced this impression.  When a newspaper reporter asked 
which allegations had been most influential, Juror James Cwick replied, 
“There was a whole lot of stuff out there. You could pretty much take your 
pick.”96  He added, “Each box, each piece of evidence was a brick. . . .  And 
if you put all the evidence together, it was a house.”97  Juror Kevin Rein 
explained, “It wasn’t a smoking gun. . . .   [I] went into deliberations with 
a feeling something was probably not on the up-and-up—and after 5½ 
months [of trial] you have an idea.”98  Patrick Collins, the chief prosecuting 
attorney,99 told the press, “This case was tried witness by witness, piece of 
evidence by piece of evidence, and it was only by looking at the totality of 
                                                 
92 Id. at 708. 
93 Id. at 706. 
94 United States v. Warner, No. 02-CR-506, 2006 WL 2583722, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 2006). 
95 Id. at *13. 
96 James Janega & Tom Rybarczyk, Small Details Painted Picture of Corruption, CHI. TRIB. 
(Apr. 18, 2006), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-04-18/news/0604180302_1_two-
jurors-deliberations-lawrence-warner [http://perma.cc/88V7-AWPJ]. 
97 Susan Kuczka, Tom Rybarczyk & Ted Gregory, Inside the Ryan Jury Room:  Cooped Up 
for Weeks, Strangers Became a Team, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 19, 2006), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-04-19/news/0604190208_1_deliberations-jurors-
george-ryan [http://perma.cc/LT26-5H29]. 
98 Janega & Rybarczyk, supra note 96. 
99 And, I am proud to say, a former student of mine. 
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the case that the true picture could be shown to this jury.” 100  At the end 
of the trial, the wall looked muddy.101 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed Ryan’s conviction.102  Most of Judge 
Diane Wood’s opinion for the court concerned the irregular jury 
deliberations.  As the opinion drew to a close, however, it rejected Ryan’s 
argument that the honest-services statute was unconstitutionally vague 
and his argument that, even if valid, the statute did not criminalize 
undisclosed conflicts of interest and state-law violations.103  A dissenting 
opinion by Judge Michael Kanne focused on the improper jury 
deliberations.104 
Judge Richard Posner and Judge Ann Williams joined Judge Kanne in 
dissenting from the Seventh Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc.105  These 
judges jointly wrote an opinion declaring that “a cascade of errors” had 
                                                 
100 Matt O’Connor & Rudolph Bush, Ryan Guilty:  A Juror’s View, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 18, 2006), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-04-18/news/0604180306_1_probe-of-judicial-
corruption-guilty-verdicts-ryan [http://perma.cc/Y2DX-5K5Y]. 
101 The trial judge, however, dismissed the suggestion that the dirt might have influenced 
the jury.  While the trial was underway, and before I became one of Ryan’s lawyers or had 
any communication with him or members of his defense team, I published a short article 
critical of the prosecution.  See Albert W. Alschuler, The Mail Fraud & RICO Racket:  Thoughts 
on the Trial of George Ryan, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 113, 113 (2006).  After Skilling, the trial judge 
gently criticized my article as well as my later argument in her court: 
Four years ago, in writing about Ryan’s prosecution, Professor 
Alschuler (who was not then one of Ryan’s lawyers) asserted that “the 
mail fraud and RICO statutes unfairly stack the deck” in large part 
because the Government was allowed to present “every allegation of 
criminal and non-criminal misconduct by Ryan and Warner that 
prosecutors have collected,” and if “some of the dirt they have thrown 
as the wall has stuck, [the jury] is likely to find the defendants guilty of 
the principal charges against them.” . . .  At oral argument on the 
motions before this court, Alschuler argued again that “[a]ll of this 
evidence went into one churning cauldron.”  Skilling, however, did not 
invalidate the honest services mail fraud statute, nor did it invalidate 
RICO.  Skilling limited prosecutions under these statutes to bribery and 
kickback schemes—the very theory of prosecution under which Ryan 
was convicted. . . . Ryan’s prosecution . . . . targeted conduct that 
remains at the core of honest services fraud. 
Ryan v. United States, 759 F. Supp. 2d 975, 980 (N.D. Ill. 2010).  Neither the jurors nor the 
prosecutor seemed to see the trial in the same way before Skilling that the trial judge did 
afterwards. 
102 United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2007). 
103 See id. at 698–99. 
104 See id. at 705 (Kanne, J., dissenting).  Judge Kanne wrote, “I have no doubt that if this 
case had been a six-day trial, rather than a six-month trial, a mistrial would have been swiftly 
declared.  It should have been here.”  Id. at 715. 
105 United States v. Warner, 506 F.3d 517, 518 (7th Cir. 2007) (Posner, Kanne, & Williams, 
JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
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rendered Ryan’s trial “a travesty.”106  The Supreme Court denied 
certiorari.107  On November 7, 2007, Ryan entered prison to begin serving 
his six-and-one-half year sentence.108 
V.  THE ROUTE BACK TO THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
A. The Supreme Court Decides Skilling 
Congress enacted the honest services statute in 1988, but the Supreme 
Court did not consider its meaning or constitutionality until twenty-one 
years later.  In 2009, the Court heard arguments in two cases that 
presented issues under the statute.109  In one of these cases, Weyhrauch, I 
submitted an amicus curiae brief arguing for the standard the Court later 
adopted in Skilling.110  No party had proposed this standard, and no court 
had yet endorsed it.  In the other case, Black, the defendant’s lawyer 
argued that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, but the government 
objected that he had not properly raised this question.111  Skilling, which 
was argued three months later, did present the issue. 
When the Court decided Skilling in June 2010, three justices declared 
that they would hold the statute unconstitutionally vague,112 and the 
remaining justices acknowledged that the defendant’s “vagueness 
challenge has force.”113  The majority concluded, however, that the statute 
could be saved from a “vagueness shoal” by confining it to a “solid core” 
that every lower court had recognized.114  It declared, “[H]onest-services 
fraud does not encompass conduct more wide-ranging than the 
paradigmatic cases of bribes and kickbacks.”115  “[N]o other misconduct 
falls within [the statute’s] province.”116  The Court not only rejected the 
                                                 
106 Id. at 520. 
107 Warner v. United States, 553 U.S. 1064 (2008). 
108  Catrin Einhorn, Ex-Gov. Ryan of Illinois Reports to Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/08/us/08ryan.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/G3BS-
MD4E]. 
109 Tr. of Oral Arg., Weyhrauch v. United States, 561 U.S. 476 (2010) (No. 08-1196), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-1196.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/ZQD2-MKF5]; Tr. of Oral Arg., Black v. United States, 561 U.S. 465 (2010) 
(No. 08-876), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-
876.pdf [http://perma.cc/4UWZ-VUVE]. 
110 See Brief of Albert W. Alschuler as Amicus Curiae at 19–20, Weyhrauch v. United States, 
561 U.S. 476 (2010) (No. 08-1196).  Skilling quoted this brief.  See Skilling v. United States, 561 
U.S. 358, 411 (2010). 
111 Tr. of Oral Arg., Black v. United States, supra note 109, at 24–28. 
112 See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 415 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas and Kennedy, JJ., concurring). 
113 Id. at 405 (majority opinion). 
114 Id. at 407. 
115 Id. at 411. 
116 Id. at 412. 
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government’s argument that the statute criminalized failing to disclose a 
conflict of interest but also warned Congress that a statute embracing this 
standard might be held unconstitutional.117 
B. Ryan Returns to the District Court 
The Winston & Strawn law firm in Chicago had represented Ryan at 
trial and on appeal without charge.118  The firm’s CEO, former governor 
James R. Thompson, was close to Ryan,119 and although the firm’s pro bono 
representation of a defendant without funds120 who faced complex, wide-
ranging charges was in the best tradition of the legal profession, it brought 
Thompson and his firm considerable criticism.121  According to the press, 
representing Ryan cost Winston & Strawn $20 million in expenses and 
lawyers’ time.122 
After Skilling, the defense team at Winston asked me to take the lead 
in representing Ryan in a post-conviction proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 
2255, a statute that enables federal prisoners to obtain relief from unlawful 
                                                 
117 Id. at 411 n.44. 
118 See Susan Chandler, Ryan a Pro Bono Problem, CHI. TRIB. (July 19, 2006), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-07-19/business/0607190154_1_winston-strawn-
illinois-governor-firm [http://perma.cc/C4ZA-CLYQ]. 
119 Ryan had been Lieutenant Governor for eight of the fourteen years of the Thompson 
administration.  Illinois Governor George H. Ryan, supra note 45. 
120 Ryan’s only significant asset was the house in Kankakee he and his wife had purchased 
in 1965 for $34,000.  See Jodi Wilgoren, Trial Shows Former Illinois Governor in Two Lights, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 29, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/29/us/trial-shows-former-
illinois-governor-in-two-lights.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/L3UW-HKJQ].  This house still 
had its Formica countertops and avocado kitchen appliances.  Ryan’s conviction caused the 
loss of his pension, including the portion he had earned before his alleged criminal conduct.  
See Ryan v. Bd. of Trs. of Gen. Assembly Ret. Sys., 924 N.E.2d 970, 975 (Ill. 2010).  He did 
recover the $235,500 he had contributed to the pension fund over the years, and he did retain 
the pension payments he had received before his conviction.  Ray Long, Ex-Gov. Ryan Denied 
Pension, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 19, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-02-19/news/ct-
met-george-ryan-pension-20100219_1_state-and-governor-ex-gov-pension [http://perma. 
cc/WJ7S-KSNP].  Ryan was seventy-three at the time he entered prison.  Michael Conlon, 
Former Illinois Governor Ryan Enters Prison, REUTERS (Nov. 7, 2007), http://www.reuters. 
com/article/2007/11/07/us-illinois-governor-idUSN0754401620071107 [http://perma.cc/ 
2M8G-JTEP]. 
121 See, e.g., Eric Zorn, Ryan Comedown Takes Thompson Too, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 8, 2007), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-11-08/news/0711071146_1 [http://perma.cc/ 
L9NG-W83V] (declaring that a “misguided display of loyalty has deeply tarnished 
Thompson’s legacy” and that “a new generation knows Thompson best as the chief defender 
and supporter of a man who personifies the cozy and crooked way politics is too often 
practiced in Illinois”). 
122 Chandler, supra note 118; see also MERRINER, supra note 45, at 21. 
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confinement after their appeals have been concluded.123  I readily agreed 
to do so.124 
The jurors’ statements to the press indicated that they might not have 
paid close attention to the phrasing of particular instructions, but a federal 
rule of evidence would have made even an abject confession of 
disregarding the instructions inadmissible.125  Any suggestion that jurors 
might not have followed their instructions to the letter seems to cause 
judges to bristle.126  But the presumption (or fiction) that the jury parsed 
the instructions with care and followed them perfectly gave Ryan a strong 
case.   
With rare exceptions, new rulings on issues of criminal procedure 
cannot be the basis for setting aside a conviction after the appellate process 
has been concluded.  These rulings do not apply retroactively.127  The 
Supreme Court has said, however, “New substantive rules generally apply 
retroactively.  This includes decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal 
statute [i.e., decisions like Skilling] . . . .  Such rules apply retroactively 
because they “necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands 
convicted of ‘an act that the law does not make criminal.’”128 
That the jury found Ryan guilty of noncriminal conduct was not 
merely a significant risk; it was a near certainty.  Some instructions did 
invite the jury to convict Ryan if he took bribes (although Ryan contended 
that these instructions also directed conviction for things that were not 
bribes).129  The bribery instructions, however, did not stand alone.  A 
                                                 
123 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) (“A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established 
by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was 
imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . may move the court 
which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.”). 
124 I was surprised when the host of a Chicago talk radio program asked me about my fee, 
but I saw no reason not to answer the question.  I advised the Winston team that, although I 
believed in the justice of Ryan’s case, I hesitated to devote the amount of time the case would 
require without compensation.  I proposed to cut my customary fee of $500 per hour in half, 
noting that $250 per hour was less than the amount Winston billed for the work of a first-
year associate.  Governor Thompson agreed to this proposal.  I kept track of my hours and 
submitted statements, and, for a time, some friends of George Ryan paid these charges.  I 
ultimately collected $25,000, all of it for services in the district court.  By then, however, 
Ryan’s friends had done their share.  My subsequent representation in the Seventh Circuit 
and the Supreme Court was pro bono.  Although the Ryan family invited me to send them a 
bill at the conclusion of the case, I declined to do so. 
125 See FED. R. EVID. 606(b). 
126 See, e.g., Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 585 (1994) (referring to “the almost 
invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions”). 
127 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989). 
128 Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351–52 (2004). 
129 See Ryan v. United States, 759 F. Supp. 2d 975, 986–90 (N.D. Ill. 2010).  In retrospect, 
although the bribery instructions were defective, raising the issue was a mistake.  The judges 
of the Seventh Circuit have little patience for arguments that appear to be secondary, and 
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general instruction based on Bloom told the jury to convict if Ryan misused 
his office for private gain for himself or anyone else.130  Other instructions 
told the jury to convict if Ryan violated any of a number of Illinois laws to 
produce gain for himself or another.131  Finally, an instruction told the jury 
to convict if Ryan failed to disclose a material conflict of interest.132 
If no one could tell which of the various grounds for conviction the 
jury had chosen, Ryan would have been entitled to a new trial under any 
of the possible standards of review.133  But Ryan’s case was much stronger 
than that.  From before the trial began until it ended, Ryan’s case had a 
recurring theme.  Ryan insisted that the government had no evidence of 
bribery, and the government insisted that it did not need any. 
Before jury selection began, the government exhibited some 
newspaper clippings to the court.134  These clippings quoted Ryan as 
saying, “[T]hey haven’t got one witness that said they gave me a corrupt 
dollar . . . .”135  The government asked the court to preclude the defense 
from arguing that corrupt dollars were necessary:  “What is clearly 
improper would be for the defense to argue or suggest to the jury that 
‘corrupt dollars’ for contracts or other specific quid pro quo evidence is a 
prerequisite to a finding of guilt on the particular mail fraud charges 
here.”136  “Specific quid pro quo evidence” is what defines bribery under 
federal law.137  Citing the First Circuit’s rulings in Sawyer and Woodward, 
the government declared, “Other circuits . . . have upheld public 
corruption prosecutions rooted in . . . the failure of a public official to 
disclose a financial interest or relationship affected by his official 
                                                 
our claim that Ryan could be excused for failing to object to two of the bribery instructions 
led to some remarkable Easterbrook flimflam.  See infra Part VII. 
130 Separate App’x of Pet’r-Appellant, Vol. 2, supra note 59, at A-000421 (jury instructions). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at A-000420. 
133 The appropriate standard was disputed.  See infra Part IX.A. 
134 See Separate App’x of Pet’r-Appellant, Vol. 1, supra note 70, at A-000163–67 (exhibits 
attached to United States Motion for Pretrial Ruling on Jury Instructions). 
135 Id. at A-000163 (a photocopy of Ryan Confident He Will be Exonerated at Upcoming Trial, 
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, July 22, 2005). 
136 Id. at A-000157 (United States Motion for Pretrial Ruling on Jury Instructions). 
137 See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 404–05 (1999) (“[F]or bribery 
there must be a quid pro quo—a specific intent to give or receive something of value in 
exchange for an official act.”); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992) (“[T]he offense 
is completed at the time when the public official receives a payment in return for his 
agreement to perform specific official acts.”); McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273 
(1991) (declaring that campaign contributions may be treated as bribes only when “the 
payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking . . . to perform or not to 
perform an official act”); id. at 283 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing that “the crime does 
require a ‘quid pro quo’”). 
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actions.”138  Although Ryan responded that the other circuits’ rulings did 
“not conform to the controlling Seventh Circuit law on honest services 
mail fraud as articulated in Bloom,”139 he lost. 
At trial, Ryan’s counsel cross-examined prosecution witnesses by 
asking such questions as:  “[W]ere you ever aware of anybody ever giving 
any money to George Ryan to affect his decisions as secretary of state?” 
and “[D]id you ever observe or see George Ryan do anything that 
indicated to you that he had ever received any money or benefit from 
anyone to influence or affect his judgment?”  Every witness answered 
“no.”140  Of the eighty-three witnesses the government called, none 
“testified that George Ryan took anything from anybody to perform his 
official acts.”141 
Occasional passages of the government’s argument to the jury seemed 
to accuse Ryan of bribery.  The prosecutor said that he “sold his office” 
and that he “might as well have put up a ‘for sale’ sign.”142  He declared 
that the “type of corruption here” was like a meal plan or open bar.143  The 
prosecutor, however, did not refer to the bribery instructions even once 
and never asked the jury to convict on the basis of these instructions.  
Instead, he quoted the conflict of interest instruction in full and called it 
“the heart of the matter.”144 
Ryan’s former chief-of-staff, Scott Fawell, testified that Ryan 
purported to pay for his Jamaican vacations by writing checks to his host 
and taking cash back.  Fawell explained that the host, Harry Klein, owned 
currency exchanges regulated by Ryan’s office and that Ryan did not want 
Klein’s hospitality known.145  Of all the evidence the government 
presented over the course of Ryan’s lengthy trial, the “cash back” 
testimony seemed to me the most damaging.146 
                                                 
138 Separate App’x of Pet’r-Appellant, Vol. 1, supra note 70, at A-000158 (United States’ 
Motion for Pretrial Ruling on Jury Instructions); see also supra notes 61–64 and accompanying 
text (describing the rulings in Sawyer and Woodward). 
139 Separate App’x of Pet’r-Appellant, Vol. 1, supra note 70, at A-000173 (Ryan’s Response 
to United States’ Motion for Pretrial Ruling on Jury Instructions). 
140 See, e.g., Separate App’x of Pet’r-Appellant, Vol. 2, supra note 59, at A-000369, A-000371, 
A-000376, A-000377, A-000378, A-000380–81 (trial transcript). 
141 Id. at A-000413 (closing argument of Ryan’s counsel). 
142 Id. at A-000392 (closing argument of government counsel). 
143 Id. at A-000396. 
144 Separate App’x of Pet’r-Appellant, Vol. 2, supra note 59, at A-000417. 
145 See id. at A-000417 (trial transcript). 
146 The chief prosecutor apparently took the same view.  See MERRINER, supra note 45, at 
174 (“[Patrick] Collins mentioned again what particularly seemed to stick in the craw of the 
U.S. attorney’s office, Ryan’s getting cash back from Harry Klein for his bogus checks for 
Jamaican vacations.  ‘As a prosecutor, when you get somebody falsifying information, that’s 
your bread and butter to show the jury that they knew what they were doing is wrong.’”). 
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Fawell’s testimony gave the government a strong case that Ryan had 
concealed a conflict of interest, and no one claimed the testimony showed 
more than that.147  Although the government emphasized Ryan’s approval 
of a lease of one of Klein’s properties, it argued only that the cash-back 
arrangement concealed “a classic conflict of interest,” not that it concealed 
a bribe: 
That’s what this instruction is about, folks.  And that is 
the heart and soul not only of the South Holland [Klein] 
situation, but each and every Warner situation, because 
[of] that flow of benefits I talked to you about.  George 
Ryan was operating under a conflict of interest every time 
he dealt with Larry Warner, because benefits were 
flowing from Larry Warner.  He had a duty to disclose 
them . . . and he didn’t.148 
The Supreme Court has said, “[F]or bribery there must be a quid pro 
quo—a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for 
an official act.”149  The government acknowledged that it had not shown 
any quid pro quo: 
How did George Ryan reciprocate this longtime 
friendship [with Warner]?  Government business is how 
he did it. . . .  Was it a quid pro quo?  No, it wasn’t.  Have 
we proved a quid pro quo?  No, [we] haven’t.  Have we 
charged a quid pro quo?  No, we haven’t.  We have 
charged an undisclosed flow of benefits back and forth.  
And I am going to get to the instructions in a minute, 
folks, but that’s what we have charged. . . .  We have 
charged an undisclosed flow of benefits, which, under the 
law, is sufficient . . . .150 
                                                 
147 Fawell was among the government witnesses who testified that he had never seen Ryan 
accept anything from anyone to influence or affect his judgment. See Separate App’x of Pet’r-
Appellant, Vol. 2, supra note 59, at A-000368 (trial transcript). 
148 Id. at A-000417–18. 
149 United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S 398, 404–05 (1999). 
150 Separate App’x of Pet’r-Appellant, Vol. 2, supra note 59, at A-000416.  The government 
in fact conceded its failure to show a quid pro quo several times: 
[I]t’s important to remember that it is not necessary for us to prove a 
quid pro quo.  I used that term before, I think.  In other words that was 
I give you this, you give me that; it doesn’t have to be that sort of 
relationship. 
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In the Seventh Circuit, Judge Kanne noted that Ryan’s case was “the 
most high profile case in Chicago in recent memory.”151  My co-counsel 
and I recognized that media hostility and public opinion could affect even 
the august federal courts.  On the merits, however, it was difficult to 
imagine a stronger case for post-conviction relief than Ryan’s.  There was 
no reason for the jury ever to have considered whether Ryan took bribes.  
The instructions marked an easier path to conviction; the government had 
urged the jury to take this path; and there was no reason to doubt that the 
jury took it. 
When, however, our post-conviction petition returned the case to the 
judge who had presided over Ryan’s six-month trial, we lost.152  Judge 
Rebecca Pallmeyer’s fifty-eight page typescript opinion argued in essence 
that, because the only remaining charges against Ryan concerned his 
relationships with Lawrence Warner and Harry Klein, his convictions 
must have rested on the “stream of benefits” they gave him.  Rejecting 
Ryan’s claim that the bribery instructions were defective, it said that the 
jury could not have convicted Ryan of receiving these benefits from 
Warner and Klein improperly without finding that they were bribes.  The 
jury might indeed have found that Ryan failed to disclose a conflict of 
interest, but it could not have made this finding without concluding at the 
same time that he took bribes.153 
                                                 
The defense . . . has repeatedly attempted to focus you on corrupt 
payments of money or cash bribes, but that’s not the case that we have 
charged here.  What the government’s case is about is that George Ryan 
received these financial benefits for himself and steered other benefits 
to third parties, benefits that were not disclosed to the public. 
Id. at A-000407. 
Now, did Ryan have a conversation with Anthony DeSantis in which 
they discussed:  Well, you pay me for this, and I’ll give a low-digit plate?  
No, they didn’t do that.  However, when Ryan had the opportunity to 
help DeSantis, a man who was interested in a low-digit plate, did he do 
it?  Yes, he did. . . .  You don’t have to have a quid-pro-quo conversation 
here. 
Id. at A-000400. 
151 United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 705 (7th Cir. 2007) (Kanne, J., dissenting). 
152 See Ryan v. United States, 759 F. Supp. 2d 975, 978 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (denying motion to 
vacate, set aside, or correct Ryan’s sentence).  Dissenting from the Seventh Circuit’s earlier 
denial of rehearing en banc, Judges Posner, Kanne, and Williams wrote: 
Imagine how a district judge who has spent six months presiding at a 
trial . . . feels about the prospect of granting a mistrial and thus 
condemning herself . . . to the agony of trying the same case over 
again. . . .  [C]an a defendant who moves for a mistrial at the end of a 
six-month trial hope for a fair shake? 
United States v. Warner, 506 F.3d 517, 524 (2007) (Posner, Kanne, & Williams, JJ., dissenting 
from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
153 See Ryan, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 999. 
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In our view, Judge Pallmeyer’s reasoning was fallacious.  A rabbit 
went into the hat when she said that the jury must have convicted Ryan of 
receiving benefits improperly. Under the instructions, Ryan would have 
been obliged to disclose the conflicts of interest created by these benefits 
even if they were legitimate, unconditional gifts.  What mattered under 
the instructions was not that the benefits were received as bribes but that 
the conflicts they created were undisclosed when Ryan later acted to 
benefit Warner and Klein.  We expected to discuss the merits of Judge 
Pallmeyer’s ruling when we argued the case to the Seventh Circuit, but it 
was not to be. 
VI.  THE ARGUMENT FROM HELL 
A. Judge Easterbrook Emerges 
In the Seventh Circuit, when a panel of judges has heard a defendant’s 
direct appeal from his conviction, that panel ordinarily hears any appeal 
growing out of a post-conviction proceeding brought by the same 
defendant.154  Judge Easterbrook was not a member of the panel that had 
heard Ryan’s direct appeal, and our post-Skilling appeal was assigned 
initially to the panel that had.  This panel denied an emergency motion 
requesting Ryan’s release on bond or, in the alternative, an order 
transferring him to a facility near his home where he could be released 
during the day.  Doctors had concluded that Lura Lynn Ryan, Ryan’s wife 
of fifty-five years and the mother of his six children, had only weeks to 
live, and the order would have enabled him to be by her bedside.155 
                                                 
154 See UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, PRACTITIONER’S 
HANDBOOK FOR APPEALS TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH 
CIRCUIT 10 (2014), https://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Rules/handbook.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
AJ8L-GDZD] (“An exception to this procedure [of randomly assigning panels] occurs when 
a previously argued case is on the docket for a subsequent hearing.  In this situation the 
original panel may be reconstituted to hear the second appeal.”); OPERATING PROCEDURES 
FOR THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 110 (2015), 
https://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Rules/rules.pdf [http://perma.cc/9MV4-PQSW] (“Briefs 
in a subsequent appeal in a case in which the court has heard an earlier appeal will be sent 
to the panel that heard the prior appeal . . . unless there is no overlap in the issues 
presented.”).  Technically, our petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 began a new civil action 
challenging the legality of George Ryan’s imprisonment; it was not a part of the original 
criminal proceedings.  Nevertheless, Collins T. Fitzpatrick, the Circuit Executive of the 
Seventh Circuit, confirmed that a panel that has heard a defendant’s direct appeal ordinarily 
hears any subsequent appeal from a ruling in a § 2255 proceeding brought by the same 
defendant.  Telephone Interview with Collins T. Fitzpatrick (Mar. 24, 2015) [hereinafter 
Fitzpatrick Interview]. 
155 See Sophia Tareen, Ex-Ill. Gov. George Ryan’s Wife Dies at Age 76, SEATTLE TIMES (June 29, 
2011), http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/ex-ill-gov-george-ryans-wife-dies-at-
age-76/ [http://perma.cc/2HM4-6GUG]. 
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On the morning of my argument, the clerk’s office revealed that the 
panel had changed.  It would include only one of the judges who had 
heard Ryan’s direct appeal—Diane Wood, a long-time colleague of mine 
on the University of Chicago Law School faculty and a former student.  
The other judges would be John Tinder and Frank Easterbrook, who was 
then Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit.  Although Judge Easterbrook was 
also a long-time colleague on the Chicago faculty, his appearance on the 
panel did not come as a welcome surprise.  In a later telephone interview, 
Collins T. Fitzpatrick, the Circuit Executive of the Seventh Circuit, 
confirmed that when a vacancy occurs in a previously selected panel, he 
selects a replacement without using a randomized process.156 
                                                 
156 Fitzpatrick Interview, supra note 154.  Fitzpatrick also confirmed that Ryan’s bail motion 
would have been considered by the panel assigned to his case rather than by the court’s 
motions panel. 
 Lawyers and scholars have questioned whether the assignment of judges to cases in the 
courts of appeals is as random as the courts say it is.  See Adam S. Chilton & Marin K. Levy, 
Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeals 4 (Dec. 17, 2014); 
Sachs, supra note 1, at 1208 (noting that, after Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure became effective, every one of the Seventh Circuit’s first seventeen opinions 
interpreting the rule was authored by either Judge Easterbrook or Judge Posner); Petition for 
a Writ of Certiorari at 33, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 135 S. Ct. 2837 (No. 
14-1122) (“The Court Should Grant Review to Disapprove of the Seventh Circuit’s Non-
Random Assignment Process”); J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral 
Assignment of Judges at the Court of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1041–42 (2000) (“[A]ll federal 
circuits purport to rely on the random assignment of judges to panels.  In fact, however, 
substantial amounts of discretion erode the randomness of those systems.”).  Cf.  Dane 
Thorley, Randomness Pre-considered:  Recognizing and Accounting for “De-Randomizing” Events 
When Utilizing Random Judicial Assignment (July 9, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2628782 [http://perma.cc/H7GF-4ZWD] (explaining why 
nominally random systems may not produce random assignments). 
 Apart from cases in which earlier arguments have occurred, the Seventh Circuit claims 
to assign judges to panels randomly.  See PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 154, at 10.  
Judges, however, seem able to game the system.  Fitzpatrick, the Circuit Executive, reported 
that he examines the briefs in every case, determines how much time to allow for argument, 
and prepares the argument calendar.  After he circulates the calendar to the judges, the 
judges advise him of disqualifying conflicts of interest and of times they are unavailable to 
hear argument.  After that, a computer randomly assigns the judges to panels.  A judge who 
wishes to avoid a particular case apparently can do so by reporting his unavailability on the 
day argument is scheduled, and a judge who wishes to hear a particular case apparently can 
increase the chance of hearing it by reporting, “The only day I’m available that week is 
Friday.” 
 I do not claim that Seventh Circuit judges steer cases to or from themselves by inventing 
scheduling conflicts; I merely note that they have the ability to do it.  Fitzpatrick observes 
that judges are advised long in advance of the weeks when arguments will occur, that they 
are discouraged from scheduling other activities during these weeks, and that scheduling 
conflicts are in fact infrequent.  When conflicts arise sufficiently in advance, moreover, judges 
typically advise Fitzpatrick of these conflicts before he prepares the argument calendar.  
Fitzpatrick Interview, supra note 154. 
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Might Chief Judge Easterbrook have discouraged the judges initially 
assigned to the case from continuing with it?  Might he have indicated that 
he was available as a replacement?  Judge Easterbrook has written a 
surprisingly high proportion of the Seventh Circuit’s opinions in both mail 
fraud cases and cases presenting issues of post-conviction procedure.  
Perhaps our case interested him, and perhaps he saw it as a vehicle for 
making a point. 
B. I Get Hit by a Truck 
Before I reached the second sentence of my argument, Judge 
Easterbrook announced that the government, Judge Pallmeyer, and I had 
missed the boat entirely: 
Mr. Alschuler: Good morning and may it please the court.  The 
jury instructions in this case marked four paths to 
conviction for honest services fraud, and three of 
them told the jury to convict for conduct that is 
not criminal. 
Judge Easterbrook: Mr. Alschuler, I am puzzled why we are talking 
about jury instructions in this case.  Your brief 
proceeds as if this were a re-run of the direct 
appeal, but of course it isn’t.  It’s a collateral 
attack and my understanding of the Supreme 
Court’s opinions in Davis and Bousley is that they 
don’t allow challenges to jury instructions—
belated challenges to jury instructions.  They 
allow the person in prison to argue that he has 
been convicted of something the law does not 
make criminal.  In other words that on the 
evidence at trial in light of the later statutory 
interpretation the only proper judgment is a 
judgment of acquittal.  But I don’t understand 
you to be arguing that on the evidence at trial the 
only proper judgment was a judgment of 
acquittal so I wonder what we have got here if 
anything. 
Mr. Alschuler: First, the government has not suggested that 
these issues are not properly before this court.  I 
think it has waived any point based on the cases 
cited by the court and, second, it is a 
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constitutional violation—Section 2255 affords 
relief to anyone who is in prison in violation of 
the Constitution or laws of the United States. 
Judge Easterbrook: Well, Mr. Alschuler do you disagree with what I 
have said, I believe, is the holding of Bousley and 
Davis? 
Mr. Alschuler: Well, I don’t recall the holding of Bousley and 
Davis, and they were not cited by the government 
and I— 
Judge Easterbrook: No, oddly—oddly they haven’t been.  The 
argument you’re making is an argument that the 
Supreme Court rejected nine to nothing in United 
States v. Frady, which said that collateral attack 
absolutely cannot be used to challenge the jury 
instructions. 
Mr. Alschuler: Well, we are not simply challenging the jury 
instructions, Your Honor. 
Judge Easterbrook: No, you are challenging the rulings on evidence 
too. 
Mr. Alschuler: No, we are saying that George Ryan was 
convicted— 
Judge Easterbrook: Look, Mr. Alschuler, 
Mr. Alschuler: —in violation of the Constitution. 
Judge Easterbrook: Mr. Alschuler—Mr. Alschuler, trying to talk over 
a question from the bench won’t do you any 
good.  The arguments that you are making look 
like the kind of arguments that the Supreme 
Court squarely said in Frady cannot be raised on 
collateral attack.  Now, am I misunderstanding 
Frady? 
Mr. Alschuler: My recollection—I read Frady once upon a time 
and my recollection of the case is dim.  We are 
saying that George Ryan was convicted in 
violation of the Constitution.  It is— 
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Judge Easterbrook: Right.  I understand that.  That’s what the D.C. 
Circuit held in Frady and which the Supreme 
Court reversed. 
Mr. Alschuler: No, the Supreme Court has said— 
Judge Easterbrook: It has said that incorrect jury instructions are not 
themselves a violation of the Constitution.  They 
are a violation of a statute maybe but not of the 
Constitution.  And the Supreme Court has said 
more often than I care to remember that just 
getting the law wrong does not entitle one to 
collateral attack. 
Mr. Alschuler: Again, we are suggesting more than that the 
District Court got the law wrong.  The law is that 
if the jury instructions permitted conviction on 
the basis of an invalid theory—permitted 
conviction of somebody who may be innocent—
then that is a constitutional violation.  It is a 
violation— 
Judge Easterbrook: Okay, if that is your argument, it is inconsistent 
with both Frady and Engle v. Isaac.  Now, if you 
have got an argument that your position is 
compatible with those cases, I’d love to hear it. 
Judge Wood: Which I think means if you are arguing in fact 
that going beyond details like jury instructions is 
this a situation where the record simply could not 
under any circumstance support finding that 
George Ryan has committed the offense that the 
Supreme Court has now recognized in Skilling.  
Maybe that is where you need to go.157  
I then did as I was told.  Abandoning my effort to explain why 
instructions directing conviction for noncriminal conduct differ from 
                                                 
157 Oral Argument at 0:28-4:50, Ryan v. United States, 645 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-
3964), vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012), http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/ 
2011/migrated.orig.10-3964_05_31_2011.mp3 [http://perma.cc/S247-27LF] [hereinafter 
Oral Argument].  All citations of the argument in this Memoir are to the recording on the 
Seventh Circuit website.  An unofficial written transcript of the argument appears as 
Appendix H in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 186a–214a, Ryan v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
2099 (2012) (No. 11-499). 
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other erroneous instructions, why they do violate the Constitution, and 
why they plainly are subject to challenge in post-conviction proceedings, 
I spent the remainder of my argument explaining why “the record simply 
could not under any circumstance support finding that George Ryan has 
committed the offense that the Supreme Court has now recognized in 
Skilling.”  Judge Wood, however, did not invite me to argue the 
insufficiency of the evidence because she had any sympathy for this 
argument.  She soon declared, “I don’t see why it was not entirely 
permissible for the jury to infer that there was an exchange going on.”158  
At the conclusion of my argument, feeling like a law student who has 
totally botched his first moot court argument, I followed the textbook 
advice every first-year law student receives and requested permission to 
address the seemingly decisive cases in a supplemental brief.159 
One can understand why instructions misstating the elements of a 
crime might seem at first glance to raise only a question of statutory 
construction, but a judge would have three ways of correcting this 
misunderstanding.  First, he could recognize that the constitutional 
requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt demands proof 
of guilt of a crime.160  Instructing a jury to convict someone of grand larceny 
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he entered a store with a 
shopping bag would not satisfy the constitutional requirement.  Second, 
the judge could look up the law.  The Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit, 
and other courts have held in countless cases that directing conviction for 
noncriminal conduct violates the Constitution.  Third, the judge could ask 
a question at argument and allow counsel to answer it. 
I cannot fully describe the jumble of thoughts that raced through my 
mind as I stood helpless at the podium before the onrushing truck.  
Among them were:   
What on earth is this man talking about?  I’ve read dozens 
of cases in which the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit, 
and other courts have considered in post-conviction 
proceedings (i.e., in “collateral attacks”) whether 
                                                 
158 Oral Argument, supra note 157, at 6:22. 
159 Id. at 16:19. 
160 See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995) (noting that the Constitution 
“require[s] criminal convictions to rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty 
of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt”); 
Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 690 (1980) (noting the “constitutional right to be 
deprived of liberty as punishment for criminal conduct only to the extent authorized by 
Congress”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Process 
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”). 
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erroneous instructions produced convictions for 
noncriminal conduct.  What about all those cases after 
McNally?  What about all those cases after other Supreme 
Court decisions narrowing the scope of criminal statutes?  
None of those cases said that the prisoner was limited to 
arguing the insufficiency of the evidence.  Had I missed 
something?  When the Supreme Court held that rulings 
narrowing the scope of criminal statutes apply 
retroactively because of the risk that a defendant might 
have been convicted of noncriminal conduct, what did it 
mean?  Could it have meant anything other than that 
prisoners may object in post-conviction proceedings to 
instructions that produced their imprisonment for 
conduct that isn’t a crime?  Why would it matter that the 
evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of a 
genuine crime if the jury had in fact convicted him of 
something else?  Didn’t Skilling itself say that allowing a 
jury to convict for noncriminal conduct violates the 
Constitution?  I have a dim recollection of Bousley, Davis, 
Frady, and Engle v. Isaac, but weren’t those cases about the 
defendants’ procedural defaults—their failures to make 
objections at the right time?  I guess they weren’t.  There 
was no procedural default in our case, and Judge 
Easterbrook says the cases are about what issues are 
cognizable in post-conviction proceedings.  Should I say 
something about procedural default?  This can’t be 
happening. 
Research after the argument quickly transformed my panic and 
confusion to indignation.  All of Judge Easterbrook’s overbearing 
assertions were false. 
Falsehood Number One: 
Davis and Bousley . . . don’t allow challenges to jury 
instructions—belated challenges to jury instructions.  
They allow the person in prison to argue that he has been 
convicted of something the law does not make criminal.  
In other words that on the evidence at trial in light of the 
later statutory interpretation the only proper judgment is 
a judgment of acquittal.161 
                                                 
161 Oral Argument, supra note 157, at 1:03–1:27. 
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There is nothing in either of the opinions cited by Judge Easterbrook 
that a rational reader could construe or misconstrue as precluding 
challenges to jury instructions in post-conviction proceedings.  Neither 
case involved or mentioned jury instructions at all. 
In Bousley v. United States,162 a prisoner pleaded guilty to using a 
firearm during a drug transaction.   The Supreme Court later held in Bailey 
v. United States163 that “use” required active employment of the firearm.  
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Supreme Court included two 
holdings.  The Court first held that Bailey applied retroactively.  The 
prisoner’s claim could be heard in a § 2255 proceeding because “decisions 
of this Court holding that a substantive federal statute does not reach 
certain conduct . . . necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant 
stands convicted of ‘an act that the law does not make criminal.’”164 
The Court then considered the significance of the prisoner’s 
procedural default.  He had not argued at trial or on appeal that “use” 
meant active use.  Instead, he had pleaded guilty.  Such a procedural 
default ordinarily precludes post-conviction relief, but the Court held that 
one of two recognized exceptions to the procedural default rule might 
apply.  If the prisoner could show that “the constitutional error” in his case 
(note those words) had “probably resulted in the conviction of one who is 
actually innocent,” the procedural default would be excused.165 
Unlike the prisoner in Bousley, Ryan had argued at trial and on appeal 
that the honest services statute did not reach the conduct that the Supreme 
Court later held it did not reach.  The government had never suggested a 
default of his claim that the statute did not reach undisclosed conflicts or 
state regulatory violations.  The procedural default ruling in Bousley did 
not bear at all on whether a prisoner who has not defaulted may challenge 
jury instructions directing his conviction for noncriminal conduct.  
(Indeed, Bousley did not require even a prisoner who had defaulted to 
show that “on the evidence at trial in light of the later statutory 
interpretation the only proper judgment is a judgment of acquittal.”  
Probable conviction of one who was actually innocent was enough to 
excuse the default.)  How anyone could read Bousley as saying that Ryan 
could not challenge the jury instructions in his case and could argue only 
the insufficiency of the evidence is beyond me. 
                                                 
162 523 U.S. 614 (1998). 
163 516 U.S. 137 (1995). 
164 Id. at 620 (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 334 (1974)). 
165 Id. at 623.  The Supreme Court also excuses a default when a prisoner can show “cause” 
for his default and “actual prejudice” resulting from the asserted error. See United States v. 
Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84 (1977). 
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Judge Easterbrook mentioned Davis in the same breath as Bousley, and 
my first guess was that Davis was a “procedural default” case too.  But I 
was thinking of the Davis v. United States that appears in volume 411 of the 
United States Reports.166  That Davis is in fact a procedural default case 
arising under § 2255.  At the end of the argument, however, when Judge 
Easterbrook agreed that the parties could file supplemental briefs, he 
revealed that he had in mind a different Davis v. United States—one that 
also arose under § 2255 and that the Supreme Court decided a year later.  
This Davis appears in volume 417 of the United States Reports.167 
In the Davis case Judge Easterbrook had in mind, the prisoner was 
serving a sentence for failing to report for induction into the armed forces 
when a ruling by the Ninth Circuit in another defendant’s case made clear 
that the order requiring him to report was invalid.  The prisoner had 
consistently maintained that the order in his case was invalid; he had not 
defaulted this claim.  The government nevertheless maintained that the 
prisoner was not entitled to relief under § 2255 because his claim was “not 
of constitutional dimension.”168 
Without considering whether the prisoner’s claim was of 
constitutional dimension, the Supreme Court ruled in his favor.169  The 
Court noted that § 2255 authorizes relief when a sentence was imposed 
“in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,”170 and it held 
that Davis was entitled to relief even if the error in his case was non-
constitutional.  If the order requiring him to report was invalid, his 
“conviction and punishment are for an act that the law does not make 
criminal.  There can be no room for doubt that such a circumstance 
inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.”171  Not a word of 
Davis suggests that instructions directing conviction for noncriminal 
conduct cannot be considered in post-conviction proceedings.  Not a word 
suggests that prisoners are limited to arguing the insufficiency of the 
evidence to support their convictions under an appropriate standard. 
Falsehood Number Two:  Although Judge Easterbrook initially invoked 
Bousley and Davis, he soon began talking about Frady and Engle v. Isaac.  
                                                 
166 Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973). 
167 Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974).  I knew that Judge Easterbrook did not have 
in mind the Davis v. United States that appears in volume 512 of the United States Reports or 
the Davis v. United States that appears in volume 160.  See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 
(1994); Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895). 
168 Davis, 417 U.S. at 342. 
169 See id. at 341–42 (“The sole issue before the Court in the present posture of this case is 
the propriety of the Court of Appeals’ judgment that a change in the law of that Circuit after 
the petitioner’s conviction may not be successfully asserted by him in a § 2255 proceeding.”). 
170 Id. at 342–43 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255) (emphasis added by the Court). 
171 Id. at 346. 
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The judge declared, “The argument that you’re making is an argument 
that the Supreme Court rejected nine to nothing in United States v. Frady 
which said that collateral attack absolutely cannot be used to challenge the 
jury instructions.”  When I stubbornly persisted, “[W]e are saying that 
George Ryan was convicted . . . in violation of the Constitution,” Judge 
Easterbrook replied, “Right.  I understand that.  That’s what the D.C. 
Circuit held in Frady and which the Supreme Court reversed. . . .  It has 
said that incorrect jury instructions are not themselves a violation of the 
Constitution.  They are a violation of a statute maybe but not of the 
Constitution.”172  And when I still insisted, “The law is that if the jury 
instructions permitted conviction of the basis of an invalid theory—
permitted conviction of somebody who may be innocent—then that is a 
Constitutional violation,” he answered, “Okay, if that is your argument, it 
is inconsistent with both Frady and Engle v. Isaac.  Now, if you have got an 
argument that your position is compatible with those cases, I’d love to 
hear it.”173 
Judge Easterbrook appeared to know United States v. Frady174 very 
well.  He recalled the Supreme Court’s vote (nine to nothing) and which 
court the Supreme Court reversed (the D.C. Circuit).  Apparently the D.C. 
Circuit had said just what I was saying—that directing conviction for 
noncriminal conduct violated the Constitution—but it had been 
unanimously reversed by the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court had 
declared both that invalid jury instructions “are not themselves a violation 
of the Constitution” and that “collateral attack absolutely cannot be used 
to challenge the jury instructions.”175  Judge Easterbrook seemed so 
familiar with Frady and was so sure of his position that I did not think he 
could be wrong. But he was—strangely and totally wrong. 
Unlike Bousley and Davis, Frady did concern jury instructions.  A 
prisoner alleged in a § 2255 proceeding that the instructions at his murder 
trial improperly directed the jury to presume malice.176  The difficulty was 
that the prisoner had not presented this claim at trial; like the prisoner in 
Bousley, he had defaulted.  The D.C. Circuit held that the prisoner’s default 
could be excused because the instructional error was plain, but the 
Supreme Court reversed.  It held that the standard for excusing 
procedural default in a § 2255 proceeding is not “plain error.”  Instead, the 
                                                 
172 Oral Argument, supra note 157, at 2:17–3:35. 
173 Id. at 3:50–4:21. 
174 456 U.S. 152 (1982). 
175 Oral Argument, supra note 157, at 2:21. 
176 Frady, 456 U.S. at 157–58. 
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prisoner must show “cause” for his default and “actual prejudice” 
resulting from the error.177 
That was all there was to Frady.  The Court did not indicate that it 
would have had any difficulty at all considering the prisoner’s claim if his 
default could have been excused or if, like Ryan, he had never defaulted.  
It did not say or in any way hint that invalid “jury instructions are not 
themselves a violation of the Constitution” and “that collateral attack 
absolutely cannot be used to challenge the jury instructions.”178   
(Incidentally, the vote in Frady was not nine to nothing.  Only five justices 
joined the majority opinion.179  Judge Easterbrook gets almost nothing 
right.) 
Engle v. Isaac180 was similar.  A state prisoner alleged in a federal 
habeas corpus proceeding that jury instructions had improperly imposed 
on him the burden of establishing his claim of self-defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  The Supreme Court acknowledged that 
the prisoner had stated “a colorable constitutional claim”181 but held that 
he had defaulted by failing to challenge the allegedly erroneous 
instructions at trial.  Moreover, this prisoner had not established “cause” 
for his default.  Nothing in Engle v. Isaac remotely suggested that 
instructions directing conviction for noncriminal conduct do not violate 
the Constitution or that prisoners may not challenge these instructions in 
§ 2255 proceedings.  In fact, the Supreme Court has clearly and repeatedly 
held that instructions directing conviction for noncriminal conduct do 
violate the Constitution and may be considered in post-conviction 
proceedings.182 
                                                 
177 See id. at 167–68. 
178 Oral Argument, supra note 157, at 2:15–3:26 
179 Justice Blackman concurred in the result; Justice Brennan dissented; and Chief Justice 
Burger and Justice Marshall did not participate. 
180 456 U.S. 107 (1982). 
181 Id. at 122. 
182 For example, in O’Neal v. McAninch, a prisoner claimed in a federal habeas corpus 
proceeding that confusing jury instructions might have led to his conviction without the state 
of mind required by an Ohio statute.  513 U.S. 432, 432–33 (1995).  The Supreme Court 
reversed the Sixth Circuit’s denial of relief because that court had required the prisoner to 
assume the burden of showing that the instructional error was prejudicial.  Id. at 435–36.  The 
proper harmless error standard, the Court said, was whether there was “grave doubt” about 
whether the error was injurious.  Id. at 436.   
 Middleton v. McNeil was a federal habeas corpus proceeding in which three jury 
instructions had correctly stated the California doctrine of “imperfect self defense” while a 
fourth misstated it.  541 U.S. 433, 438 (2004).  The Supreme Court noted that the prisoner had 
a constitutional right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the offense 
charged and that instructions misstating a state’s substantive criminal law could violate that 
right.  Id. at 437.  After reviewing the record, however, it held that there was no “reasonable 
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Judge Easterbrook is the kind of judge who cites twenty- and thirty-
five-year-old cases that neither party mentioned, and even after a lawyer 
has conceded that he is unprepared to discuss these cases, he demands to 
know “if you have got an argument that your position is compatible with 
those cases.”183  Additionally, he asks questions that he refuses to allow a 
lawyer to answer and then declares, “Mr. Alschuler, trying to talk over a 
question from the bench won’t do you any good.”184  What is worse, Judge 
Easterbrook’s bullying rests on stuff he just makes up.  The truth is not in 
him. 
When I returned to the counsel table, the argument in Ryan was not 
over.  Judge Easterbrook was about to demonstrate that he is an equal-
opportunity bully. 
C. The Government Gets Hit by the Truck 
Here’s how the government’s argument began:  
Ms. Barsella: May it please the court.  I’ll begin by just saying 
that the government did not make a specific 
reference at all to the issue that Judge 
Easterbrook brought up, and we do apologize for 
that.  Obviously any forfeiture on our part does 
not bind the court and, if the court does want to 
                                                 
likelihood” that the jury had applied the instructions in a way that violated the Constitution.  
Id. at 437–38. 
 In Hedgpeth v. Pulido, a federal habeas corpus petitioner claimed that a misstatement of 
California law permitted his felony murder conviction even if he joined the felony after the 
murder had been committed.  555 U.S. 57, 59 (2008).  A federal district court agreed, holding 
that the constitutional error was not harmless.  Id.  Although the Ninth Circuit affirmed, it 
declared that there was no need even to inquire whether the error was harmless because the 
error was “structural.”  Id. at 59–60.  The Supreme Court concluded that the error was not 
structural and was subject to harmless error review.  Id. at 62. 
 In Waddington v. Sarausad, the Supreme Court once more resolved a claim on federal 
habeas corpus that a misstatement of state criminal law violated the Constitution by 
directing conviction for noncriminal conduct.   555 U.S. 179, 191 (2009).  It held that there was 
no “‘reasonable likelihood’ that the jury applied the instruction in a way that relieved the 
State of its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id.; 
see also Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 147 (1977); Buggs v. United States, 153 F.3d 439, 
444 (7th Cir. 1998) (Because “this court has stated numerous times that a conviction for 
engaging in conduct that the law does not make criminal is a denial of due process,” a pre-
Bailey instructional error “had consequences of constitutional magnitude . . . [and] is 
cognizable on collateral review.”). 
183 Oral Argument, supra note 157, at 4:14. 
184 Id. at 2:44. 
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have additional briefing on those points, we will 
be happy to submit them. 
Judge Easterbrook: Ms. Barsella, I have a question not only about this 
subject which the government seems quite 
mysteriously to have forfeited, and it is very 
strange because this is a subject that was 
important enough to the United States that the 
Solicitor General took it to the Supreme Court in 
Frady, and now, the United States having won 
Frady, the U.S. Attorney in Northern Illinois just 
ignores it.  But I don’t understand why we are 
here at all.  This petition was filed more than two 
years after Ryan’s conviction became final and 
appears to be untimely.  But with respect to that 
issue it seems like the United States has not 
forfeited.  The United States has waived, and I 
don’t get it.  2255(f)(3) says that the time restarts 
if the Supreme Court makes a new decision and 
“if that right has been newly recognized by the 
Supreme Court and made retroactively 
applicable to cases on collateral review.”  What 
decision of the Supreme Court has made Skilling 
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 
review? 
Ms. Barsella: I believe below we did look at that issue, and it 
was determined that when a statute is now newly 
interpreted so as to make one interpretation no 
longer law that we believe that (f)(3) did allow 
the 2255— 
Judge Easterbrook: But that’s not what the statute says.  The statute 
says that the decision has to be made 
“retroactively applicable to cases on collateral 
review.”  Now what you seem to have thought, 
and I won’t press this further because this is 
something the government—untimeliness is an 
affirmative defense which seems to have been 
waived.  What you seem to be thinking here is 
that, if you’re confident that the Supreme Court 
will declare it retroactive, then we just don’t 
bother with details like the Supreme Court 
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actually declaring it retroactive.  And that is 
certainly not how this court has interpreted 
2255(f)(3) in the past. 
Ms. Barsella: I do apologize for the fact that we misinterpreted 
that.  We thought that in light— 
Judge Easterbrook: Did you misinterpret it, or is this just a 
Department of Justice wide position? 
Ms. Barsella: No, it isn’t.  When we analyzed this below in the 
District Court, we were satisfied he could raise it 
in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Skilling, and we were obviously mistaken.185 
Falsehood Number Three:  “[T]hat is certainly not how this court has 
interpreted § 2255(f)(3) in the past.”186 
The government was not mistaken.  Ryan’s petition was timely.  A 
Seventh Circuit decision was directly on point, and it said just what Ms. 
Barsella said it did.  This decision had been written by Judge Easterbrook.  
His confident assertions were flatly inconsistent with one of his own 
opinions. 
A federal statute permits a prisoner who has never before filed a 
federal post-conviction petition to file such a petition within a year of a 
Supreme Court decision recognizing a new right if this right has been 
“made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”187  When the 
prisoner has previously filed a federal post-conviction petition, however, 
it is not enough that a new right has been “made retroactively applicable 
to cases on collateral review.”  Rather, to file a second, third, or fourth 
petition, “a new rule of constitutional law” must have been “made 
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.”188 
Judge Easterbrook’s opinion for the Seventh Circuit in Ashley v. United 
States189 italicized the words by the Supreme Court just as I have.   The court 
held that, although a prisoner who files a second post-conviction petition 
must show that a new rule of constitutional law has been made retroactive 
by the Supreme Court, a prisoner filing a first petition need not.190  “To treat 
                                                 
185 Id. at 16:51–19:45. 
186 Id. at 19:12. 
187 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) (2012). 
188 Id. § 2255(h)(2) (emphasis added). 
189 266 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2001). 
190 See id. at 673 (“[A]n initial petition may be filed within a year of a decision that is ‘made 
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review[.]’  A second petition, by contrast, 
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the first formulation as identical to the second is not faithful to the 
difference in language. . . .  District and appellate courts, no less than the 
Supreme Court, may issue opinions ‘holding’ that a decision applies 
retroactively to cases on collateral review.”191  Moreover, a district court 
may make its determination of retroactivity in the same proceeding in 
which it considers whether a prisoner is entitled to relief.192  Ryan’s post-
conviction petition was his first (and only) petition.  It clearly was 
timely.193 
Judge Easterbrook berated the government for overlooking two 
apparently dead-bang winning arguments.  It was “odd,”194 “strange,”195 
and “mysterious”196 that it had mentioned neither Frady nor the statute of 
limitations.  On both points, he reduced the government’s apparently 
bungling counsel to abject apology.  And on both points, Judge 
Easterbrook had made up the law, had seen no need to check the 
authorities on which he relied, had assumed the incompetence of the 
lawyers on both sides (and of the district judge), and had gotten every 
proposition wrong. 
As the argument proceeded, Judge Easterbrook continued to 
browbeat the government’s lawyer: “Why are you back to arguing 
harmless error?  That’s the approach that both Engle v. Isaac and Frady 
expressly reject.”197  “You’re contradicting Frady again, but go ahead.”198 
Then it was time for my rebuttal.  Despite the court’s direction to 
address only the sufficiency of the evidence, I decided to give our 
principal argument one last shot.  During the badgering of Ms. Barsella, I 
had paged through our brief and found the place where it quoted a 
statement of Skilling that was clearly inconsistent with Judge 
Easterbrook’s bluster.  I began my rebuttal by reading this sentence to the 
court: “Skilling says that ‘Constitutional error occurs when a jury is 
                                                 
depends on ‘a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review 
by the Supreme Court.’”). 
191 Id. 
192 See id. at 673–74 (explaining that “[j]ust as a district court possesses jurisdiction to 
determine its own jurisdiction, it must possess the authority to determine a precondition to 
the timeliness of an action”). 
193 An early draft of our brief for the Seventh Circuit included a footnote that cited Ashley 
and explained why Ryan’s petition was timely.  When we sought permission to file a brief 
of 20,000 words, however, declaring that fewer words would not allow us to present Ryan’s 
case adequately, the Court allowed us a brief of 17,000 words.  We then eliminated the 
footnote on timeliness along with other explanatory material that might have been helpful 
to the court but that did not bear on any contested issue. 
194 Oral Argument, supra note 157, at 2:16. 
195 Id. at 17:25. 
196 Id. at 17:30. 
197 Id. at 20:18. 
198 Id. at 21:54. 
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instructed on alternative theories of guilt and returns a verdict that may 
rest on an invalid theory.’”199  I will not soon forget the look of contempt 
on Judge Easterbrook’s face as I read this sentence. 
VII.  JUDGE EASTERBROOK OPINES 
A. Concocting Something Else:  A Fantasy Forfeiture 
The prosecutors and Ryan’s lawyers submitted their supplemental 
briefs to the Seventh Circuit at the same time.  Ours concluded: 
The parties have fairly and responsibly briefed and 
argued this case, focusing on the sorts of instructional 
issues that this Court and others have addressed in 
countless post-conviction proceedings.  The Court should 
decide this case on the basis of the issues they have 
presented.  Instructions that direct conviction without 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of conduct that the 
legislature has made criminal violate the Constitution, 
and allegations of this sort are cognizable in section 2255 
proceedings.  The “cause and prejudice” standard has no 
application to non-defaulted objections.  When 
instructions have directed conviction for noncriminal 
conduct and the petitioner has not defaulted his 
objections, the question before a habeas corpus court is 
whether the instructional error was harmless.200 
Disregarding our plea to decide the case on the basis of the issues 
submitted by the parties, Judge Easterbrook invented a new ground of 
decision—one that not only had not been advanced by the parties but that 
neither he nor anyone else had mentioned during argument.  Judge 
Easterbrook’s opinion for the Seventh Circuit concluded that Ryan had 
defaulted his objection to the undisclosed-conflicts instruction and the 
state-law instruction.201 
Ryan, however, had objected to these instructions at trial and on 
appeal.202  The Seventh Circuit had considered his arguments and had 
                                                 
199 Id. at 32:34 (quoting Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 414 (2010) (emphasis added)). 
200 Supplemental Memorandum of Pet’r-Appellant George H. Ryan at 29–30, Ryan v. 
United States, 645 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-3964), vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2099 
(2012). 
201 See Ryan v. United States, 645 F.3d 913, 915 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded, 132 S. 
Ct. 2099 (2012). 
202 See, e.g., Separate App’x of Pet’r-Appellant, Vol. 1, supra note 70, at A-000174-A000183 
(Ryan’s Response to United States’ Motion for Pretrial Ruling on Jury Instructions); 
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upheld the challenged instructions.203  The government had not claimed 
any default.  Indeed, its supplemental brief declared, “[I]n the 
government’s view, Ryan has not procedurally defaulted his claim that he 
was convicted for conduct that is not a crime.”204  It added, “In order to 
obtain review of his claim in a § 2255 proceeding, Ryan does not have to 
establish ‘cause’ because his claim was not defaulted.”205  The government 
did maintain, however, that Ryan had failed to object to two of the 
instructions he said defined bribery incorrectly. 
Judge Easterbrook’s opinion did not mention Ryan’s objections to the 
improper instructions and did not mention the government’s express 
concession that there was no default.  The opinion described Ryan’s 
supposed default this way: 
[Ryan] never made the argument that prevailed in 
Skilling:  that § 1346 is limited to bribery and kickback 
schemes. . . .  The forfeiture as we see it is that Ryan never 
made in the district court or on appeal an argument that 
§ 1346 is best understood to be significantly more limited 
than Bloom held. . . .  [W]hile Ryan’s lawyers proposed 
instructions based on Bloom—which was more favorable 
to defendants than the law in some other circuits—
Skilling’s lawyers contended that § 1346 is much 
narrower if not unconstitutionally vague.  Skilling asked 
the Supreme Court to disapprove Bloom.  That Court 
ruled in his favor.  If Ryan’s lawyers had done what 
Skilling’s lawyers did, the controlling decision today 
might be Ryan rather than Skilling.  (Ryan’s petition for 
certiorari beat Skilling’s to the Supreme Court.) 
 
Nothing prevented Ryan from making the arguments 
that Skilling did. Many other defendants in this circuit 
contended that Bloom was wrongly decided.  Conrad 
Black was among them. . . .  The Supreme Court heard 
Black’s case along with Skilling’s. . . .  Because Black had 
preserved an objection to Bloom’s understanding of 
                                                 
Consolidated Brief and Required Short App’x of the Defendants-Appellants Lawrence E. 
Warner and George H. Ryan, Sr. at 61, United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(Nos. 06-3517 & 06-3528). 
203 See United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 698–99 (7th Cir. 2007). 
204 Government’s Supplemental Memorandum at 6, Ryan v. United States, 645 F.3d 913 
(7th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-3964), vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012). 
205 Id. at 7 (emphasis removed). 
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§ 1346, we inquired on remand from the Supreme Court 
whether the errors were harmless.206 
Falsehood Number Four:  “Skilling asked the Supreme Court to 
disapprove Bloom.  That Court ruled in his favor. . . .  Nothing prevented 
Ryan from making the arguments that Skilling did.  Many other 
defendants in this circuit contended that Bloom was wrongly decided.  
Conrad Black was among them.”207 
                                                 
206 Ryan, 645 F.3d at 915–16.  Although this passage includes everything the Seventh Circuit 
said about Ryan’s asserted default, the ellipses in the passage mark substantial omissions.  
Interspersed with the court’s description of the supposed default was its discussion of 
whether this default could be excused.  Judge Easterbrook wrote, “Ryan sees ‘cause’ in this 
circuit’s pre-Skilling law.”  Id. at 915.  He did not reveal, however, that Ryan had mentioned 
“cause” only in response to the government’s argument that he had waived or forfeited his 
objection to two bribery instructions.  The opinion made it seem that Ryan had 
acknowledged his failure to object to any of the invalid instructions, including the 
undisclosed-conflicts instruction.   
 Judge Easterbrook’s deception on this point probably was deliberate.  After reading our 
supplemental brief and the government’s, he certainly knew that Ryan had objected 
throughout the proceedings to the undisclosed-conflicts instruction.  Without mentioning 
Ryan’s objections or the government’s concession that there had been no default, he spoke 
only of Ryan’s argument that the default could be excused.  And he did that by transposing 
an argument for excusing a lack of objection to two bribery instructions into an argument for 
excusing a larger default that the parties agreed had not happened. 
 Judge Easterbrook misled his readers again when he described the content of Ryan’s 
argument concerning “cause” (the argument Ryan made to excuse his failure to object to the 
two bribery instructions).  According to Judge Easterbrook, Ryan maintained that “cause” 
existed simply because it would have been “pointless” to challenge Bloom in the Seventh 
Circuit.  Id. at 916–17.  Judge Easterbrook responded that it would not have been pointless 
and, more importantly, “[t]hat the argument seems likely to fail is not ‘cause’ for its 
omission.”  Id. at 916.  Ryan, however, had made no such argument.  In language Judge 
Easterbrook quoted, the Supreme Court has said that, although the “futility” of an argument 
is not “cause” for failing to make it, “cause” does exist when a claim “is so novel that its legal 
basis is not reasonably available to counsel.”  Id. at 916–17 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 
523 U.S. 614, 622–23 (1998)).  In language Judge Easterbrook did not quote, the Supreme 
Court has also said that “cause” exists when the Court has issued a decision “‘overturn[ing] 
a longstanding and widespread practice to which [the Court] has not spoken, but which a 
near-unanimous body of lower court authority has expressly approved.’”  Reed v. Ross, 468 
U.S. 1, 17 (1984).  Ryan observed that in the twenty-two years between the enactment of the 
honest services statute and Skilling, no court had endorsed a construction limiting this statute 
to bribery and kickback schemes.  Reply Brief of Pet’r-Appellant at 19–20, Ryan v. United 
States, vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012) (2011) (No. 10-3964).  He noted that, after 
McNally, which similarly departed from uniform lower court precedent, the Seventh Circuit 
and other courts had excused the procedural defaults of § 2255 petitioners.  See id. (citing, 
e.g., Bateman v. United States, 875 F.2d 1304, 1308 (7th Cir. 1989)).  Ryan asked the court to 
approve a recent district court ruling that “Skilling represents just the sort of ‘clear break with 
the past’ that the United States Supreme Court contemplated as giving rise to ‘cause.’”  See 
id. (citing Stayton v. United States, 766 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1266 (M.D. Ala. 2011)). 
207 See Ryan, 645 F.3d at 916. 
56 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
Jeffery Skilling did not ask the Supreme Court to disapprove Bloom.  
To the contrary, in both the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit, he cited 
Bloom in support of his arguments.208  Similarly, Conrad Black never 
contended that Bloom was wrongly decided.  His briefs in the Supreme 
Court did not mention the case.209  In the Seventh Circuit, he cited Bloom 
frequently—but only in support of his arguments.210  Perhaps “[m]any 
other defendants in [the Seventh] circuit contended that Bloom was 
wrongly decided,” but my research has not revealed even one. 
Judge Easterbrook must have known after reading our supplemental 
brief and the government’s that Ryan had objected throughout the 
proceedings to the undisclosed-conflicts and other invalid instructions.  A 
forthright judge would have acknowledged Ryan’s objections and, if he 
thought these objections inadequate, explained why.  Judge Easterbrook’s 
discussion implied, however, that Ryan had not made the proper objection.  
Just what the proper objection would have been was unclear, but it 
apparently would have been either “overrule Bloom” or “limit honest-
services fraud to bribery and kickback schemes.” 
Judge Easterbrook did not explain why Ryan should have said either 
of these things.  Although the judge apparently regarded Ryan’s argument 
as inconsistent with Bloom, Bloom had said nothing about undisclosed 
conflicts.211  It had merely held that “an employee deprives his employer 
of his honest service[] . . . if he misuses his position . . . for personal 
gain,”212 and the idea that an official “misuses his position” whenever he 
fails to disclose any past favor that is “capable of influencing” one of his 
                                                 
208 See Reply Brief for Pet’r at 21, Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (No. 08-1394); 
Brief of Defendant-Appellant Jeffrey K. Skilling at 65, United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529 
(5th Cir. 2009) (No. 06-20885). 
209 See Brief for the Pet’rs, Black v. United States, 561 U.S. 465 (2010) (No. 08-876). 
210 See Opening Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 47, 51–52, 55, 86, United States v. Black, 
530 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2008) (Nos. 07-4080, 08-1030, 08-1072, 08-1106). 
211 Recall the phrasing of the government’s pretrial argument: “Other circuits . . . have 
upheld public corruption prosecutions rooted in . . . the failure of a public official to disclose 
a financial interest or relationship affected by his official actions.”  Separate App’x of Pet’r-
Appellant, Vol. 1, supra note 70, at A-000158 (United States’ Motion for Pretrial Ruling on 
Jury Instructions Related to Mail Fraud Allegations) (emphasis added).  Even the 
government did not claim that Bloom had criminalized undisclosed conflicts.   
 Judge Easterbrook remarked that Bloom “was more favorable to defendants than the 
law in some other circuits.”  Ryan, 645 F.3d at 916.  This statement might have been true when 
Bloom was decided.  By the time the Seventh Circuit read Bloom to forbid undisclosed 
conflicts and to make federal felonies of minor state regulatory violations and violations of 
civil consent decrees, however, no court anywhere had interpreted the honest-services 
statute more expansively.  The Seventh Circuit remained “the mail fraud capital of America.”  
See Borre v. United States, 940 F.2d 215, 226 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
212 United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 656–57 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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decisions is a stretch.  When Ryan had a strong argument that the 
undisclosed-conflicts instruction was inconsistent with Bloom, why should 
he have asked the Seventh Circuit to overrule this decision? 
Requiring litigants to anticipate the precise standard the Supreme 
Court approved in Skilling would make post-conviction relief available 
only to soothsayers.  Until I proposed a bribes-and-kickbacks standard in 
my amicus brief in Weyhrauch, no litigant anywhere appears to have 
argued for this standard.213  Ryan objected to the unconstitutional thing 
that happened to him—directing the jury to convict him of a nonexistent 
crime.  That should have been enough. 
Judge Easterbrook’s suggestion that Ryan’s name could have replaced 
Skilling’s on the leading Supreme Court decision if only his lawyers had 
been as capable as Black’s or Skilling’s214 was not only obnoxious but 
wrong.  Conrad Black had said none of the things Judge Easterbrook 
apparently thought necessary to obtain relief on the basis of Skilling.  Just 
as Black did not ask any court to disapprove Bloom, he never argued that 
honest-services fraud should be limited to bribery and kickback schemes.  
His principal argument was:  “Section 1346 May be Applied to Private 
Sector Relationships Only if the Jury Finds that Defendants Contemplated 
Economic Harm to the Party to Whom ‘Honest Services’ Were Owed.”215  
In its supplemental brief to the Seventh Circuit, the government observed 
that “Black was given the benefit of Skilling,” reviewed the arguments 
Black presented, and declared that Ryan had “similarly preserved his 
claim.”216  Judge Easterbrook apparently paid no attention. 
Like Black, Jeffrey Skilling did not argue in the court of appeals or in 
his petition for certiorari that honest-services fraud should be limited to 
bribery and kickback schemes.  After I had proposed a bribes-and-
kickbacks standard in my amicus brief, however, and after some justices 
                                                 
213 See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 423 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Until 
today, no one has thought . . . that the honest-services statute prohibited only bribery and 
kickbacks.”); Brief of Albert W. Alschuler as Amicus Curiae, supra note 110, at 19–20.  Ryan in 
fact came close to anticipating Skilling—closer than Black, Skilling, or anyone else I know of.  
He maintained:  “A Quid Pro Quo Is Required Where Mail Fraud Charges Are Predicated On 
the Receipt of A Campaign Contribution” and “A Quid Pro Quo is Required Where Federal 
Charges Are Predicated on The Receipt of a Gift.”  Separate App’x of Pet’r-Appellant, Vol. 
1, supra note 70, at A-000175, A-000179 (Ryan’s Response to United States’ Motion for Pretrial 
Ruling on Jury Instructions) (argument headings). 
214 See Ryan, 645 F.3d at 916. 
215 Brief for the Pet’rs, supra note 209, at 22 (argument heading).  The Supreme Court did 
not accept Black’s argument.  Black v. United States, 561 U.S. 465, 474 (2010).  Although the 
Court held specifically that the honest-services statute does not reach undisclosed conflicts 
and so accepted the argument Ryan made, post-Skilling honest-services fraud still proscribes 
private-sector bribes and kickbacks that have neither produced nor were expected to 
produce economic harm. 
216 Government’s Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 204, at 6. 
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had expressed interest in my proposal during the argument in Black,217 
Skilling argued in the alternative for a bribes-and-kickbacks standard in 
his merits brief.218  Litigants in the Supreme Court, however, may not raise 
issues for the first time in their merits briefs.219 
The Supreme Court ignored Skilling’s belated effort to propose a 
bribes-and-kickbacks standard.  It noted instead his principal argument—
that “the honest-services statute . . . is unconstitutionally vague.”220  It 
declared that, in the absence of a narrowing construction, this statute 
would encounter the “vagueness shoal” that Skilling had protested from 
the outset.221  The statute apparently would have been unconstitutional in 
the un-narrowed form applied to him.  Skilling’s objection to the statute’s 
vagueness entitled him to the benefit of the narrowing construction the 
Court approved.222 
Like Skilling, Ryan had consistently objected that the honest-services 
statute was unconstitutionally vague.  Judge Easterbrook, however, 
declared this objection insufficient.  He wrote, “Ryan contended at trial 
and on appeal . . . that § 1346 is unconstitutionally vague, an argument 
that Skilling rejected.  He never made the argument that prevailed in 
Skilling:  that § 1346 is limited to bribery and kickback schemes.”223  But 
Skilling did not reject the argument that the honest-services statute was 
unconstitutional in the sprawling form it took when Ryan was convicted.  
Judge Easterbrook and his colleagues refused to give Ryan the benefit the 
Court gave Skilling although Ryan had made precisely the same objection.  
They left Ryan’s conviction under the un-narrowed statute in place 
despite his persistent objection that this statute was unconstitutional.224 
B. Disregarding and Concealing the Government’s Waiver 
Judge Easterbrook’s claim that Ryan defaulted his objection to the 
undisclosed conflicts and other instructions was especially odd because 
                                                 
217 See Tr. of Oral Arg. at 5, 8–10, 12–13, 33–34, 42, Black v. United States, 561 U.S. 465 (2010) 
(No. 08-876), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-
876.pdf [http://perma.cc/4UWZ-VUVE]. 
218 See Brief of Defendant-Appellant Jeffrey K. Skilling, supra note 208, at 61–63. 
219 See SUP. CT. R. 24(1)(a).  Even if Skilling had proposed a bribes-and-kickbacks standard 
in his petition for certiorari, he would not have proposed it in the courts below.  In the world 
of Judge Easterbrook, he would have forfeited any claim to the benefit of that standard. 
220 Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 399 (2010). 
221 Id. at 368. 
222 See id. at 413–14. 
223 Ryan v. United States, 645 F.3d 913, 915 (7th Cir. 2011). 
224 Skilling and Black came before the Supreme Court on direct appeal, and a direct appeal 
differs in many ways from a collateral attack.  In determining whether a forfeiture or 
procedural default has occurred, however, the two sorts of proceedings do not differ at all. 
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the government acknowledged expressly that Ryan did not default.225  
Judge Easterbrook once wrote, “Claims of waiver may be waived in turn; 
claims of forfeiture may be forfeited (or waived). . . .  We could hardly 
penalize [one party] for forfeiture while overlooking [the opposing 
party’s] decision not to make forfeiture an issue.”226  Why, then, did Judge 
Easterbrook penalize Ryan’s supposed forfeiture while overlooking the 
government’s deliberate decision not to make forfeiture an issue? 
Judge Easterbrook explained, “On collateral review . . . a court may 
elect to disregard a prosecutor’s forfeiture, because the Judicial Branch has 
an independent interest in the finality of judgments.”227  The judge cited 
only one authority in support of this statement, Day v. McDonough.228  In 
Day, the Supreme Court held that, in some circumstances, a court may 
advance an objection a prosecutor has not made, but Day also said, “[W]e 
would count it an abuse of discretion to override a State’s deliberate 
waiver of a limitations defense.”229  It added, “[S]hould a State 
intelligently choose to waive a statute of limitations defense, a district 
court would not be at liberty to disregard that choice.”230 
The Supreme Court’s distinction between inadvertent forfeiture and 
deliberate waiver is one that Judge Easterbrook knows well.  In our case, 
he declared, “Ryan himself proposed some of the instructions that the 
judge gave . . . and with respect to them he has waived and not just 
forfeited the line of argument he makes now.”231  In a case involving 
another Illinois governor, he wrote, “[A]t oral argument counsel for the 
United States represented that the prosecutor is not invoking any doctrine 
of forfeiture to block appellate review.  The possibility of forfeiture thus 
has been waived, and as the subject is not jurisdictional the prosecutor’s 
waiver is conclusive.”232 
Recall the unequivocal language of the government’s supplemental 
brief:  “[I]n the government’s view, Ryan has not procedurally defaulted 
his claim that he was convicted for conduct that is not a crime.”233  And:  
“In order to obtain review of his claim in a § 2255 proceeding, Ryan does 
not have to establish ‘cause’ because his claim was not defaulted.”234  How 
                                                 
225 See Government’s Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 204, at 6. 
226 EEOC v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 256 F.3d 516, 526–27 (7th Cir. 2001). 
227 Ryan, 645 F.3d at 917–18. 
228 547 U.S. 198 (2006). 
229 Id. at 202. 
230 Id. at 211 n.11. 
231 Ryan, 645 F.3d at 915.  Although he did not say so, Easterbrook spoke only of Ryan’s 
supposed waiver of objections to two challenged bribery instructions. 
232 United States v. Blagojevich, 612 F.3d 558, 560 (7th Cir. 2010). 
233 Government’s Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 204, at 6. 
234 Id. at 7 (emphasis removed). 
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could Judge Easterbrook have disregarded the government’s express 
waiver of any argument that Ryan had defaulted? 
Certainly Judge Easterbrook could not have missed this waiver after 
our petition for rehearing complained loudly about his disregard of 
Day.235  By then, however, Judge Easterbrook’s opinion had been released 
to the public.  Because the government’s waiver occurred in the 
supplemental brief it filed at the same time we filed ours and because these 
briefs were the parties’ last filings in the case, we couldn’t have flagged 
the government’s waiver earlier.236  After examining our petition, Judge 
Easterbrook must have known that finding a procedural default despite 
the government’s waiver was contrary to Day.  I imagine, however, that 
he was unwilling to lose face by withdrawing his opinion and starting 
over. 
Judge Easterbrook’s disregard of the government’s waiver was not 
only insupportable but also out of character.  No one has pounced on 
waivers, forfeitures, and defaults by government lawyers more eagerly 
than he.237  In a habeas corpus case brought by a state prisoner, for 
example, a lawyer for the state contended that no error had occurred in 
the prisoner’s trial.  Until this lawyer filed his reply brief, however, he did 
not argue that, if any error had occurred, it would have been harmless.  A 
Seventh Circuit rule then in effect provided, “A reply brief shall be limited 
                                                 
235 See Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 32, at 1, 11–13 (emphasizing Day’s holding 
that it is “an abuse of discretion to override a State’s deliberate waiver”). 
236 We previously emphasized the government’s forfeiture of any claim of default.  See 
Supplemental Memorandum of Pet’r-Appellant George H. Ryan, supra note 200, at 1, 4–5.  I 
was relieved when the government elevated its earlier forfeiture to an express waiver.  I 
feared that Judge Easterbrook might try to invent a procedural default on Ryan’s part once 
he realized what Bousley, Frady, and Engle v. Isaac were really about, and I was confident that 
the government’s concession would prevent him from doing so.  But I underestimated Judge 
Easterbrook. 
237 See, e.g., Buchmeier v. United States, 581 F.3d 561, 563 (7th Cir. 2009) (Easterbrook, J.) 
(“The United States thus has forfeited, if it has not waived, any contention that the overall 
performance of Buchmeier’s lawyer was adequate; it has effectively consented to treating 
this collateral attack as a rerun of the direct appeal.”); Taylor v. United States, 287 F.3d 658, 
660 (7th Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook, J.) (“As is common, the prosecutor ignored this shortcoming, 
forfeiting any entitlement to dismissal of the appeal for noncompliance with 
§ 2253(c)(1)(B).”); Carter v. Litscher, 275 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook, J.) (“[T]he 
certificate of appealability fails to identify a substantial constitutional issue and thus does 
not satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) . . . [but] the state has made nothing of this problem and thus 
has forfeited the benefits of that statute.”); United States v. Patterson, 215 F.3d 776, 785 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J.) (“[T]he United States did not argue forfeiture in its appellate brief.  
It raised forfeiture for the first time in the memorandum submitted after argument, and by 
that delay it forfeited any right to assert Robert’s potential forfeitures at an earlier stage.”); 
Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 358 (7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Because the state has 
ignored the limitations that § 2253(c)(2) places on a court’s power to issue a certificate of 
appealability, it has forfeited the benefits of that statute.”). 
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to matter in reply.”238  Because the prisoner had been convicted of an 
especially monstrous rape, Judge Easterbrook warned that there might 
soon be blood on the lawyer’s hands: 
Astoundingly, the state did not mention harmless error in 
its opening brief. . . .  It got ’round to harmless error at 
page 19 of its reply brief. . . .  The state has not offered a 
reason for omitting this question from its opening brief.  
We find it inexplicable.  Procedural rules apply to the 
government as well as to defendants.  Illinois has 
forfeited what would have been its best argument.  If as a 
result a violent offender goes free, the Attorney General 
of Illinois must understand where the responsibility 
lies—with his own staff.239 
In a § 2255 proceeding very similar to Ryan’s, Judge Easterbrook held 
the government’s forfeiture decisive.  The petitioner in Toulabi v. United 
States240 was convicted of mail fraud before the Supreme Court held in 
McNally v. United States241 that the mail fraud statute proscribed only 
deprivations of property, not deprivations of the intangible right of honest 
services.  When the petitioner argued that the indictment in his case 
charged him with conduct that is not a crime, the government responded 
as it did in almost every other post-McNally case:  The jury could not have 
convicted the petitioner without finding a deprivation of property.242 
Judge Easterbrook noted that the petitioner and the government 
might have made the same arguments if the case had come before the 
court on direct appeal.  Without offering an answer to the “contentious 
issue” of what the difference between direct and collateral review might 
be, he declared that McNally “[s]urely” could not be taken into account 
“by giving the defendant what amounts to a second appeal of his 
conviction.”243  Judge Easterbrook criticized some earlier Seventh Circuit 
decisions for failing “even [to] mention[] the difference between direct and 
collateral review,” and he wrote: 
                                                 
238 Wilson v. O’Leary, 895 F.2d 378, 384 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting what was then Seventh 
Circuit Rule 28(f)). 
239 Id.  Perhaps the lawyer who forfeited what would have been the state’s best argument 
for keeping a vicious rapist off the streets immediately left the profession and enrolled in 
dental school.  I think I would have. 
240 875 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1989). 
241 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
242 Toulabi, 875 F.2d at 123–24; see supra Part IV (describing McNally and its aftermath). 
243 Toulabi, 875 F.2d at 124. 
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Our case shows why this might occur. . . .  The 
prosecutor . . . briefed the issues just as if this were a 
direct appeal, and Toulabi responded in kind.  This is a 
common sequence in McNally cases on collateral attack, 
and it is then not surprising when the court—without 
mentioning the difference between direct and collateral 
attack—proceeds to conduct a full review.  The 
prosecutor's curious choice precludes us from deciding in 
today's case how far an appellate court should inquire 
into the record and instructions of a case on collateral 
review after McNally.  We accept the case as the parties 
have presented it, examining the record and instructions 
as we would on direct appeal.244 
Because the prosecutor had not made the arguments Judge Easterbrook 
wanted him to make and because “the jury did not necessarily find that 
Toulabi’s scheme deprived Chicago of . . . property,” the court reversed a 
trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief.245 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Kenneth Ripple insisted that neither 
the Seventh Circuit nor the vilified prosecutor had done anything wrong.  
He wrote: 
[T]he government argued that the indictment sufficiently 
charged an offense and that the jury instructions did not 
render the trial fundamentally unfair since it was 
impossible for the jury to find the existence of a scheme 
to deprive the City of intangible rights without also 
finding the existence of a scheme to deprive the City of 
property interests. . . . This is essentially the same 
analysis that this court’s cases have employed in 
reviewing section 2255 attacks on pre-McNally mail fraud 
convictions.  It is the analysis we should expect to see 
from the government in future cases as well.246 
                                                 
244 Id. at 124–25. 
245 Id. at 126. 
246 Id. at 128 (Ripple, J. concurring).  Like Judge Easterbrook, Judge Ripple was a 
conservative appointed to the Seventh Circuit by President Reagan.  In subsequent cases, the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office and the court appeared to disregard Judge Easterbrook’s dicta and to 
follow Judge Ripple’s advice.  But see Young v. United States, 124 F.3d 794, 797, 803 (7th Cir. 
1997) (Easterbrook, J.) (taking a position later rejected by the Supreme Court in Bousley and 
declaring that defendants who had pleaded guilty prior to Bailey could not challenge their 
convictions for noncriminal conduct, criticizing two Seventh Circuit decisions for allowing 
defendants to challenge their pre-Bailey guilty pleas, criticizing the U.S. Attorney’s Office for 
2015] Easterbrook 63 
After criticizing the government, Judge Easterbrook accepted 
Toulabi’s case “as the parties have presented it,”247 and until Ryan’s case, 
he had done the same thing in every other case.  Although a court may in 
appropriate circumstances disregard the government’s non-assertion of a 
procedural default, Judge Easterbrook seems never to have done so until 
Ryan’s case.  In view of the fact that the government had not merely 
forfeited but had waived any claim of default in his case, Ryan’s was an 
especially inappropriate case for departing from the pattern Judge 
Easterbrook had observed for more than twenty-five years.  In the earlier 
cases, disregarding the government’s non-assertion of a petitioner’s 
default might have been lawful, but in a case in which the government 
had deliberately waived any claim of default, it was not.248 
Judge Easterbrook strained so hard to keep George Ryan in prison that 
it seems fair to speculate about his motives.  The following section of this 
Memoir considers three hypotheses. 
C. Possible Explanations 
Hypothesis One:  Judge Easterbrook sought to nullify Skilling. 
Although Judge Easterbrook had devised the Seventh Circuit 
standard that Skilling abrogated,249 this hypothesis seems to me unlikely.  
When researching my amicus brief in Weyhrauch, the closest thing I could 
find to authority for a bribes-and-kickbacks standard was a statement 
                                                 
failing to challenge these Seventh Circuit decisions in the case before the court, criticizing the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office for failing to make several other arguments, and finally, after several 
pages of blustery dicta, deciding the case on the basis of the issues submitted by the parties).  
See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 616 (1998) (allowing some defendants who pleaded 
guilty before Bailey to challenge their convictions for noncriminal conduct); Bailey v. United 
States, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995) (holding that only “active employment” of a firearm during a 
drug transaction constitutes “use” of the firearm during that transaction). 
247 Toulabi, 875 F.2d at 124. 
248  Before disregarding even an inadvertent forfeiture, a court must determine that doing 
so would serve the interests of justice.  Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 210 (2006).  Judge 
Easterbrook did not mention any possible interest in freeing innocent people from prison but 
did consider “the independent interest [of the judicial branch] in the finality of judgments.”  
He wrote, “Ryan’s trial lasted eight months, and his appeal led to more than 100 pages of 
opinions by four judges of this court.”  Ryan, 645 F.3d at 918. 
 Ryan’s trial did not last eight months, and no one ever said it did.  Judge Easterbrook 
just made it up.  Ryan’s six-month trial was bad enough.  But what chutzpah it took for a 
court whose decisions had permitted the government to conduct a wide-ranging, kitchen-
sink trial to cite the appalling length of this trial, not as proof that the defendant had been 
denied due process, but as proof of how much due process he had received.  The court’s 
chutzpah was especially remarkable because the Supreme Court already had held the six-
month trial improper, declaring that the jury should have heard only evidence of bribes and 
kickbacks. 
249 See United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 656–57 (7th Cir. 1998) (Easterbrook, J.). 
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Judge Easterbrook had made for the Seventh Circuit in United States v. 
Thompson.250  He noted that “misuse of office” is a “slippery” phrase, 
declared that “one of these days we may need to gloss the phrase to reduce 
the risk that uncertainty poses to public servants,” and added that it 
would be “consistent with [the] language” of the honest-services statute 
to limit it to situations “in which the ‘private gain’ comes from third 
parties who suborn the employee with side payments.”251  Judge 
Easterbrook is not a champion of the mail fraud statute, and I doubt that 
he sought to nullify Skilling.  The judge’s extreme hostility to affording 
post-conviction relief, however, might have affected his judgment.252 
Hypothesis Two:  In “the most high profile case in Chicago in recent 
memory,”253 Judge Easterbrook took account of public sentiment and the 
prospect of criticism in the press. 
This hypothesis also seems to me unlikely.  I doubt that Judge 
Easterbrook cared at all that, in Chicago parlance, Ryan’s was a “heater 
                                                 
250 484 F.3d 877, 883–84 (7th Cir. 2007). 
251 Id. at 883–84.  I noted this statement several times in my brief.  See Brief of Albert W. 
Alschuler as Amicus Curiae, supra note 110, at 3, 20, 21, 28.  I sent a copy to Judge Easterbrook 
with a note declaring that, unlike most briefs, mine had a hero, and he was it. 
252 Judge Easterbrook declared that a post-conviction petitioner was entitled to a new trial 
only when he could show “that on the evidence at trial in light of the later statutory 
interpretation the only proper judgment is a judgment of acquittal.”  Oral Argument, supra 
note 157, at 1:19.  As shown above in Part VI, Judge Easterbrook’s attribution of this standard 
to the Supreme Court was a fabrication.  Neither that Court nor any other had required post-
conviction petitioners to show that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions. 
But consider for a moment how harsh Judge Easterbrook’s imaginary standard would be.  
This standard would leave people in prison even when it seemed far more likely than not 
that they had never been convicted of a crime.  Suppose, to take an exaggerated example, 
that a judge told a jury to convict a defendant of grand larceny if he either entered a store 
with a shopping bag or stole property worth more than $300.  Suppose the evidence of 
entering with a shopping bag was overwhelming while the evidence of stealing was weak.  
The evidence of stealing consisted entirely of an identification of the defendant by a nearly 
blind witness who claimed to have seen him in dim light.  Even after a higher court ruled 
that entering with a shopping bag was no crime, Judge Easterbrook apparently would leave 
the defendant in prison.  Questions of credibility are for the jury, and, if the defendant had 
been convicted of larceny under proper instructions, the testimony of the nearly blind 
witness would have been sufficient to support his conviction.  From Judge Easterbrook’s 
perspective, it would not matter that, because of the court’s invitation to convict of a 
nonexistent crime, the jury would have had no reason to examine the witness’s credibility or 
to consider whether the defendant stole anything.  Chief Justice Rehnquist took a better view 
of the purpose of post-conviction remedies when he wrote for the Supreme Court in Bousley, 
“[O]ne of the principal functions of habeas corpus [is] ‘to assure that no man has been 
incarcerated under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk that the innocent 
will be convicted.’”  Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998). 
253 See United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 705 (7th Cir. 2007) (Kanne, J., dissenting). 
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case.”254  His own view of the case, however, might have been influenced 
by what he read in the papers. 
Hypothesis Three:  Judge Easterbrook sought to save face. 
Although I do not know what motivated Judge Easterbrook’s first 
opinion in Ryan’s case, this final hypothesis rings truer to me than the 
others.  For Judge Easterbrook to decide the case on the basis of the issues 
submitted by the parties would have been to acknowledge to his fellow 
judges and to the parties that his statements of law at argument had been 
erroneous and his badgering of counsel unjustified.  If preserving his 
dignity required inventing a default by Ryan that never occurred and 
concealing a waiver by the government that did, perhaps he was willing 
to subordinate both truth and justice to that objective.255    
VIII.  A MINI-VICTORY IN THE SUPREME COURT AND A NEW ARGUMENT 
As every law clerk reviewing petitions for certiorari knows, the 
Supreme Court’s mission is not to correct errors but to resolve “unsettled 
questions of federal constitutional or statutory law of general interest.”256  
Nevertheless, our certiorari petition in Ryan’s case asked for error 
correction.  We wrote that “[t]he Seventh Circuit’s failure to follow Day 
and implement Skilling warrants, at a minimum, a per curiam reversal and 
                                                 
254 If Judge Easterbrook had sought public praise, however, his opinion would have 
succeeded.  The Chicago Tribune editorialized:  
On appeal, Ryan’s attorneys advanced several arguments here, one of 
which was that he didn’t accept bribes or kickbacks, so he shouldn’t be 
in the slammer.  What’s remarkable about the appellate court 
smackdown, written by Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook, is the swift 
backhand it delivers to that claim. . . .  As if to tell Ryan’s lawyers:  You 
cannot be serious. 
No, Corruption Isn’t “Just Politics”:  Jurors and Judges Aren’t Buying that Defense Mantra, CHI. 
TRIB. (July 11, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-07-11/opinion/ct-edit-
honest-20110711_1_public-corruption-jurors-convict [http://perma.cc/ATJ5-N73N]. 
255 Early in his opinion, Judge Easterbrook came close to acknowledging that Skilling 
applied retroactively and that Ryan’s post-conviction petition was timely.  See Ryan v. United 
States, 645 F.3d 913, 914–15 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012) 
(declaring that “a district court or court of appeals may make the retroactivity decision under 
§ 2255(f)(3),” and adding, “Because the United States has waived any limitations defense to 
Ryan’s position, we need not decide whether Skilling applies retroactively on collateral 
review, though Davis . . . and Bousley . . . imply an affirmative answer”).  Although Judge 
Easterbrook thus came close to confessing error on a tangential issue after realizing that one 
of his own opinions flatly contradicted his statements during argument, I doubt that he was 
capable of backing away from his more pivotal claim that post-conviction petitioners may 
not challenge the jury instructions that produced their convictions for noncriminal conduct. 
256 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT:  HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 269 (1987); see 
Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian Court:  Common Law Judging Versus Error 
Correction in the Supreme Court, 63 WASH & LEE L. REV. 271, 278–80 (2006). 
66 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
remand with directions to address the issues presented by the parties.”257  
We cited a Supreme Court rule declaring that certiorari can be appropriate 
when a court of appeals has “so far departed from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings . . . as to call for an exercise of this Court’s 
supervisory power.”258 
While Ryan’s petition was before the Supreme Court, the Court 
decided Wood v. Milyard.259  Wood was in large part a replay of Day v. 
McDonough.260  The Court declared, as it had in Day, that a federal court is 
“not at liberty . . . to bypass, override, or excuse” the government’s 
deliberate waiver of a non-jurisdictional defense.261  But Wood made it 
more difficult for a court—especially an appellate court—to disregard the 
government’s inadvertent forfeiture of a defense.  Calling “the principle 
of party presentation basic to our adversary system,” the Court said that 
appellate courts may notice forfeited defenses only in “exceptional cases” 
and “extraordinary circumstances.”262 
After its decision in Wood, the Supreme Court granted our petition for 
certiorari, vacated the Seventh Circuit’s judgment, and remanded Ryan’s 
case for further consideration in light of Wood.263  The Seventh Circuit 
would no longer be able to conceal and disregard the government’s 
waiver of Ryan’s supposed default, or so we thought. 
A new argument focused on the issues the parties had briefed and the 
district court decided more than a year earlier.  To the amazement of 
everyone in the courtroom, Judge Easterbrook asked no questions.  None 
of the seasoned court watchers in attendance could recall any other case 
in which he remained silent.264 
Seventeen days after the argument, the court issued another opinion 
by Judge Easterbrook upholding the denial of post-conviction relief.265 
                                                 
257 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 41, at 3. 
258 Id. (citing S. CT. RULE 10(a)). 
259 132 S. Ct. 1826 (2012). 
260 547 U.S. 188 (2006). 
261 Wood, 132 S. Ct. at 1830; see Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202, 210 n.11 (2006). 
262 Wood, 132 S. Ct. at 1833. 
263 Ryan v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012). 
264 A recording of this argument can be found at http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/ 
2012/migrated.orig.10-3964_07_20_2012.mp3. 
265 Ryan v. United States, 688 F.3d 844 (7th Cir. 2012).  Judge Easterbrook has not always 
been so speedy.  His opinion for the court in the case of another former Illinois governor 
appeared more than one-and-one-half years after the case had been argued.  See United States 
v. Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729, 729 (7th Cir. 2015) (listing the argument date as Dec. 13, 2013 
and the decision date as July 21, 2015). 
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IX.  JUDGE EASTERBROOK OPINES AGAIN 
A. Another Concocted Waiver 
Judge Easterbrook’s second opinion mentioned neither the 
government’s waiver of Ryan’s supposed procedural default nor the 
imaginary default itself.  Instead, the opinion announced a substantially 
broader waiver by the government.  Judge Easterbrook declared that the 
government waived any objection to treating Ryan’s post-conviction 
challenge as though it were a direct appeal.  He also declared that Wood v. 
Milyard required the court to treat the government’s possibly misguided 
decision as conclusive: 
The United States . . . did not contend that there is any 
difference between the sort of review available on a 
petition under § 2255 and the kind available on direct 
appeal. . . .  At oral argument this court questioned 
whether the same standard should be used on direct 
appeal and collateral attack.  We directed the parties to 
file supplemental memoranda concerning that subject.  
Once again the United States failed to contend that the 
standards differ.  We concluded, however, that the 
standards are materially different, and that on collateral 
review the appropriate question is whether the evidence 
was sufficient to convict under the correct 
instructions. . . .  
 
The Supreme Court held Ryan’s petition for certiorari 
until it decided Wood v. Milyard. . . . The Supreme Court 
found a waiver in Wood because the state knew about a 
potential defense and told the court that it was not 
asserting it.  That’s exactly what happened here.  The 
United States Attorney learned at oral argument that 
there was a potential procedural argument, then 
informed the court that the argument was not being 
asserted.  Why a litigant comes to such a decision is 
irrelevant, and a mistake in reaching a decision to 
withhold a known defense does not make that decision 
less a waiver . . . .  We therefore turn to the harmless-error 
inquiry, framed as if this were a direct appeal.266 
                                                 
266 Ryan, 688 U.S. at 847–48. 
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Falsehood Number Five:  “The United States . . . did not contend that 
there is any difference between the sort of review available on a petition 
under § 2255 and the kind available on direct appeal.”267 
In all of its filings in the district court and the court of appeals, the 
government emphasized the difference between the review available 
under § 2255 and that available on direct appeal.  The government’s 
supplemental brief following oral argument declared, “Collateral relief 
is . . . limited only to those grievously wronged; ‘an error that may justify 
reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral attack on 
a final judgment.’”268 
To be sure, the government did not claim that “on collateral review 
the appropriate question is whether the evidence was sufficient to convict 
under the correct instructions.”269  If it had, it could not have cited any 
decision in support.  The government did contend, however, that the 
review afforded § 2255 petitioners was limited in the same way the 
Supreme Court had limited the review afforded state prisoners who 
sought federal habeas corpus relief. 
When a constitutional error (such as directing a jury to convict for 
noncriminal conduct) has occurred at trial, a court hearing a direct appeal 
must set aside the defendant’s conviction unless the government shows 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.270  In Brecht v. 
Abrahamson,271 however, the Supreme Court held that a less demanding 
harmless error standard applies in post-conviction proceedings brought 
by state prisoners.  A state prisoner is entitled to federal habeas corpus 
relief only when the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”272  In O’Neal v. McAninch,273 
the Supreme Court modified the Brecht standard slightly.274  It then 
applied its modified standard in a habeas corpus proceeding in which a 
state prisoner alleged that jury instructions directed his conviction for 
                                                 
267 Id. at 847. 
268 Government’s Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 204, at 7 (quoting Brecht v. 
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 634 (1993), United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982), and 
United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 (1979)) (emphasis omitted). 
269 Ryan, 688 F.3d at 847. 
270 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 
271 507 U.S. 619 (1993). 
272 Id. at 631. 
273 513 U.S. 432 (1995). 
274 See id. at 436 (declaring that “[w]hen a federal judge in a habeas proceeding is in grave 
doubt about whether a trial error of federal law had ‘a substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury’s verdict,’ that error is not harmless”). 
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noncriminal conduct.275  The government argued that the court should 
apply the Brecht-McAninch harmless-error standard in Ryan’s case.276 
Five years after McAninch, however, in Lanier v. United States,277 the 
Seventh Circuit held that the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard applies in § 2255 proceedings brought by federal prisoners.278  
The government argued that the court overlooked Brecht and McAninch 
when it decided Lanier,279 and it probably did.  We nevertheless 
maintained that Lanier was correct.  The federal courts’ willingness to 
allow state courts to deny post-conviction relief to some state prisoners 
who may be innocent does not imply that the federal courts should refuse 
to release prisoners whom they themselves have wrongly convicted.280 
Although Ryan and the government battled fiercely about what 
harmless error standard to apply on collateral review, Judge Easterbrook 
portrayed the government’s lawyers as ignorant of the distinction 
between collateral and direct review.  He attributed to them a sweeping 
waiver they did not make and thereby avoided acknowledging his 
unlawful disregard of a waiver they did make.  He agreed to treat Ryan’s 
case as though it had arisen on direct appeal, but only because he said the 
government had never asked him to do anything else—not even after the 
court advised it that a materially different standard applied.  By falsely 
                                                 
275 The petitioner in McAninch claimed that erroneous instructions might have led to his 
conviction without the state of mind required by an Ohio statute.  Id. at 435.  The Supreme 
Court reversed the Sixth Circuit’s denial of relief because that court had required the prisoner 
to assume the burden of showing that the instructional error was prejudicial.  Id. at 436.  The 
Court declared that grave doubt about whether the erroneous instructions had a substantial 
and injurious effect would entitle the petitioner to post-conviction relief. 
276 Brief of the United States at 20–23, Ryan v. United States, 645 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(No. 10-3964). 
277 220 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2000). 
278 Id. at 839. 
279 See Brief of the United States, supra note 276, at 21–22. 
280 We noted that the decision in Brecht rested on federalism concerns inapplicable to § 2255 
proceedings brought by federal prisoners.  The Supreme Court wrote: 
The reason most frequently advanced in our cases for distinguishing 
between direct and collateral review is the State’s interest in the finality 
of convictions that have survived direct review within the state court 
system. . . .  We have also spoken of comity and federalism.  “The States 
possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law. 
In criminal trials they also hold the initial responsibility for vindicating 
constitutional rights.  Federal intrusions into state criminal trials 
frustrate both the States’ sovereign power to punish offenders and their 
good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.” 
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 
107, 128 (1982)). 
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portraying the government’s lawyers as goats, Judge Easterbrook 
managed to avoid revealing what a goat he had been himself.281 
B. Poor at Counting 
Immediately after announcing that the court would honor the 
government’s waiver by reviewing Ryan’s case as though it had arisen on 
direct appeal, Judge Easterbrook declared that the court would do no such 
thing.  The court would refuse to review four of Ryan’s mail fraud 
convictions because they had come before the court on collateral review 
rather than direct appeal.282  The court would ignore these convictions 
although no judge had suggested at argument that the convictions could 
be ignored and although the government had never maintained that the 
court could properly refuse to review these convictions.  Again, Ryan’s 
first opportunity to discuss a determinative issue would come in his 
petition for rehearing.  The ever-moving target had shifted once again.283 
Judge Easterbrook explained: 
Ryan was sentenced to 78 months in prison on one RICO 
count.  This is the only sentence he is still serving.  All of 
the others—[including his] 60 month sentences on the 
seven mail-fraud convictions . . . have expired.  Section 
2255 allows a person to contest ongoing imprisonment, 
                                                 
281 Judge Easterbrook earlier had portrayed Ryan’s lawyers and the district court as goats.  
In the statement of facts in his first Ryan opinion, he wrote:   
[After the Supreme Court decided Skilling,] Ryan began a collateral 
attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  He contended that the jury instructions 
were defective because they permitted the jury to convict him on an 
honest-services theory without finding a bribe or a kickback . . . .  
Asserting that the errors could not be shown to be harmless under the 
standard used on direct appeal, Ryan asked for a new trial.  The district 
court concluded that the errors are harmless under that standard and 
denied Ryan’s petition. 
Ryan v. United States, 645 F.3d 913, 914 (7th Cir. 2011).  By mentioning that the harmless-
error standard invoked by Ryan and employed by the district court was the one “used on 
direct appeal,” Judge Easterbrook apparently sought to convey the impression that Ryan’s 
lawyers and the district court did not understand the difference between direct and collateral 
review.  In fact, Ryan advocated the standard used on direct appeal only because the Seventh 
Circuit itself had endorsed the use of this standard in Lanier. 
282 Ryan v. United States, 688 F.3d 844, 848–49 (7th Cir. 2012). 
283 By the time of Judge Easterbrook’s opinion, Ryan had filed five briefs in the Seventh 
Circuit—a principal brief, a reply brief, a supplemental brief following argument, a petition 
for rehearing, and a supplemental brief following the Supreme Court’s remand.  These briefs 
had discussed almost everything under the sun except the possibility that the court might 
dredge up previously unmentioned doctrines to justify a refusal to hear his challenges.  After 
so much process, denying due process was a challenge, but Judge Easterbrook managed to 
do it. 
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and it is the single RICO sentence that underlies Ryan’s 
imprisonment today.  The jury was told that, to convict 
Ryan on the RICO charge, it had to find a pattern of 
criminality including at least two acts of criminal mail 
fraud.  The jury convicted Ryan on seven-mail fraud 
counts, so if at least two of these are valid after Skilling 
then the RICO conviction is valid as well. 
 
Ryan’s challenge to expired sentences may or may not be 
moot as a technical matter.  A collateral attack begun 
while custody continues can continue afterward to stave 
off collateral consequences . . . .  Ryan has not identified 
any collateral consequences of the mail-fraud 
convictions . . . that would not equally be required by the 
RICO conviction . . . .  Even on direct appeal, courts are 
free to pretermit decisions about convictions producing 
concurrent sentences, when the extra convictions do not 
have cumulative effects.  As a practical matter, the 
concurrent sentence doctrine was abrogated for direct 
appeal when Congress imposed a special assessment of 
$50 (now $100) for each separate felony conviction . . . .  A 
collateral attack under . . . § 2255 contests only custody, 
however, and not fines or special assessments. 
 
An attempt to decide on collateral review whether each of 
the seven mail-fraud convictions was valid would smack 
of an advisory opinion—something that no waiver, 
however deliberate, can authorize.  Ryan has not argued 
that the district judge would have given a lower sentence 
on the RICO count had she believed, say, that only four 
of the mail-fraud convictions represented bribes, and the 
other three represented undisclosed conflicts of interest.  
After all a district judge may base a sentence on 
established misconduct whether or not that misconduct 
has led to a conviction.284 
After upholding three mail fraud convictions, Judge Easterbrook 
declared that they were “more than enough to sustain the RICO 
conviction and sentence.”285  Although Judge Easterbrook had indicated 
that reviewing more than the number of convictions needed to sustain the 
                                                 
284 Ryan, 688 F.3d at 848–49. 
285 Id. at 852. 
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RICO charge would “smack of an advisory opinion—something that no 
waiver, however deliberate, can authorize,” he did not indicate which of 
the court’s three rulings was advisory.286 
Judge Easterbrook’s discussion blended three doctrines that 
sometimes can block post-conviction review—the custody requirement, 
the concurrent-sentence doctrine, and mootness.  Even if the judge’s 
portrayal of the facts had been accurate (and I will tell you shortly why it 
was an outrageous falsehood), none of these doctrines would have limited 
the court’s review of any of Ryan’s convictions. 
Custody.  Relief under § 2255 is limited to people in custody, but 
custody is determined at the time a post-conviction petition is filed, not at 
the time a court resolves a case.287  Even when a petitioner has served his 
entire sentence and even when no collateral consequences of his 
conviction remain, a petitioner satisfies the custody requirement if, like 
Ryan, he was imprisoned when he filed his petition.288 
The Concurrent Sentence Doctrine.  The concurrent sentence doctrine 
permits a court to deny review when a concurrent sentence has no adverse 
consequences for a petitioner.289  Judge Easterbrook acknowledged that 
this doctrine had become a dead letter in cases on direct review.290  He 
failed to note that the Seventh Circuit also had recognized its demise in 
§ 2255 proceedings.  Vacating any of Ryan’s mail fraud convictions would 
have required a redetermination of his sentence, including his RICO 
sentence.291  In a case arising under § 2255, the Seventh Circuit said, “Our 
own cases . . . undercut the rationale behind the concurrent sentence 
doctrine; we have held that ‘the vacation of a concurrent sentence might 
lead the sentencing judge to reconsider a sentence not vacated.’”292 
                                                 
286 Id. at 849. 
287 See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968) (“[U]nder the statutory scheme, once 
the federal jurisdiction has attached in the District Court, it is not defeated by the release of 
the petitioner prior to completion of [the] proceedings . . . .”). 
288 See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (noting that the absence of any collateral 
consequences may make a habeas corpus action moot but does not justify a dismissal for lack 
of custody if the petitioner was in custody when he filed his petition). 
289 See Claassen v. United States, 142 U.S. 140, 146 (1891). 
290  Ryan, 688 F.3d at 849. 
291 See United States v. Smith, 103 F.3d 531, 533–35 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that vacating one 
or more counts in a § 2255 proceeding “unbundles” the sentencing package and requires a 
redetermination of sentence). 
292 Borre v. United States, 940 F.2d 215, 223 n.16 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. 
Holzer, 848 F.2d 822, 824 (7th Cir. 1988)).  Judge Easterbrook observed, “Ryan has not argued 
that the district judge would have given a lower sentence on the RICO count had she 
believed, say, that only four of the mail-fraud convictions represented bribes, and the other 
three represented undisclosed conflicts of interest.”  Ryan, 688 F.3d at 849.  But of course 
Ryan would have had no reason to make any argument at all on the subject until Judge 
Easterbrook jumped from the box shouting “Surprise!”  Even then, Ryan, like Judge 
2015] Easterbrook 73 
Mootness.  Judge Easterbrook wrote, “Ryan’s challenge to expired 
sentences may or may not be moot as a technical matter.”293  Because 
vacating any of Ryan’s convictions would have led to resentencing on the 
others, none of his convictions was even arguably moot.  Moreover, in a 
habeas corpus proceeding in which the petitioner had both completed his 
sentence and regained the right to vote before the Supreme Court decided 
his case, the Court declared:  
[S]ome collateral consequences of his conviction remain, 
including the possibility that the conviction would be 
used to impeach testimony he might give in a future 
proceeding and the possibility that it would be used to 
subject him to persistent felony offender prosecution if he 
should go to trial on any other felony charges in the 
future.294 
Judge Easterbrook not only distorted the custody requirement, the 
concurrent sentence doctrine, and the doctrine of mootness; he also 
probably erred by declaring that any two valid mail fraud convictions 
would justify Ryan’s RICO conviction.295  The Supreme Court has said that 
a pattern of racketeering activity is not established simply by proving two 
predicate crimes.  Although two predicates are necessary, they may not be 
sufficient.296  One cannot know whether the jury would have found the 
                                                 
Easterbrook, could only have speculated about what sentence the trial judge would impose 
if she learned that most of Ryan’s supposed crimes were not crimes.  That is why vacating 
some of Ryan’s convictions would have required the Seventh Circuit to remand the case to 
the trial judge herself for resentencing on the surviving counts. 
 Judge Easterbrook seemed confident that, even if most of Ryan’s convictions were 
vacated because they were for non-criminal conduct, his initial sentence would be 
unchanged.  “After all, a district judge may base a sentence on established misconduct 
whether or not that misconduct has led to a conviction.”  Ryan, 688 F.3d at 849.  Unlike Judge 
Easterbrook, however, a district judge might not regard every nondisclosure of a conflicting 
interest as “misconduct” after Skilling.  All of Judge Easterbrook’s statements were 
contestable or just plain wrong, but Ryan had no opportunity to contest them. 
293 Ryan, 688 F.3d at 848. 
294 Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S 387, 391 n.4 (1985).  See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55 
(1968) (acknowledging that an earlier Supreme Court decision had “abandoned all inquiry 
into the actual existence of specific collateral consequences and in effect presumed that they 
existed”). 
295 Ryan, 688 F.3d at 848. 
296 H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237 (1989).  One of the lessons you 
might draw from this Memoir is that federal criminal law and procedure are horribly 
complicated and arcane.  The judges who pretend that jurors can understand the law are 
confused about it themselves.  Congress could simplify things, but, like the judges, it adds 
new gargoyles to the edifice instead.  See Albert W. Alschuler, Terrible Tools for Prosecutors: 
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requisite pattern if the number of predicate crimes had been fewer.  Judge 
Easterbrook’s bending of doctrine was surpassed, however, by his 
bending of the facts.  His analysis rested on a false premise.  
Falsehood Number Six:  “Ryan was sentenced to 78 months in prison on 
one RICO count.  This is the only sentence he is still serving.  All of the 
others—[including his] 60 month sentences on the seven mail-fraud 
convictions . . . have expired.”297 
Ryan’s mail fraud sentences had not expired.  He entered prison on 
November 7, 2007.298  If, hypothetically, he had been serving only a sixty-
month (five-year) prison sentence, he would not have completed this 
sentence until November 7, 2012, three months after the court issued its 
opinion.299  Moreover, Ryan’s sentences on the mail fraud counts extended 
beyond sixty months of imprisonment.  On each count, he was sentenced 
to a year of supervised release after leaving prison.300  Supervised release 
qualifies as custody.301  None of the legal doctrines Judge Easterbrook 
invoked treat supervised release any differently from imprisonment.  
Ryan’s sentences on the mail fraud convictions still had fifteen months to 
run.302 
As you are about to see, Judge Easterbrook engaged in some 
remarkable gymnastics to sustain the three mail fraud charges the court 
did review.  Why was he reluctant to engage in the same gymnastics to 
sustain them all? 
I suspect he wasn’t reluctant.  At argument, Judge Wood had asked 
whether we differentiated among the counts.  I answered that we didn’t, 
but Judge Wood’s question made it seem likely that she did. 
                                                 
Notes on Senator Leahy’s Proposal to “Fix” Skilling v. United States, 67 SMU L. REV. 501, 521–
24 (2014) (arguing that “democracy sucks”). 
297 Ryan, 688 F.3d at 848. 
298 Catrin Einhorn, Ex-Gov. Ryan of Illinois Reports to Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/08/us/08ryan.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/G3BS-
MD4E]. 
299 Ryan, 688 F.3d at 846 (noting that the court issued its opinion on August 6, 2012). 
300 Separate App’x of Pet’r-Appellant, Vol.1, supra note 70, at A-000187 (the district court’s 
judgment). 
301 See Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 349 (1973); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 
236, 243 (1963); Kusay v. United States, 62 F.3d 192, 193 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J.). 
302 A federal statute provides that a prisoner who “has displayed exemplary compliance 
with institutional disciplinary regulations” can receive as much as fifty-four days credit per 
year toward his sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2012).  I did not know how much vested “good 
time” Ryan had accumulated by the date of Judge Easterbrook’s opinion, and I don’t imagine 
Judge Easterbrook did either.  Nothing in the record indicated that Ryan had received any.  
Even if one were to assume that Ryan had been awarded the maximum allowable amount 
of good time credit toward a five-year sentence, he would have been on supervised release 
at the time of the Seventh Circuit’s decision. His mail fraud sentences had not “expired.” 
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One of the counts the court refused to address was the Harry Klein 
(Jamaica vacations) count.  As you may recall, the government’s closing 
argument had emphasized that Ryan’s cash-back arrangement with Klein 
concealed a “classic conflict of interest,” not that it concealed a bribe.303  
The three other unreviewed counts concerned two contracts awarded to 
lobbying clients of co-defendant Lawrence Warner.  The decisions to 
award these contracts had been made by professionals in Ryan’s office 
after competitive evaluations, and Ryan did not participate in the 
evaluations.  Speaking of one of the contracts, the district court said, 
“[T]here is no suggestion that Ryan took any specific ‘action’ related to the 
IBM contract—and the standard definition of bribery requires some sort 
of official action in exchange for the benefits received.”304 
Judge Easterbrook’s opinion declared that the benefits Ryan and 
members of his family had received from Warner “underlay” the three 
mail fraud convictions the court reviewed.305  Perhaps at least Judge Wood 
was unwilling to say that any benefits provided by Warner underlay any 
of the unreviewed counts.  Judge Easterbrook, however, might have 
persuaded Judge Wood that addressing the question would not matter 
because all of Ryan’s mail fraud sentences had expired.306 
C. At Long Last:  The Court Addresses the Issues Briefed by the Parties 
Turning to the three mail fraud convictions the court agreed to review, 
Judge Easterbrook declared that the defects of the pre-Skilling instructions 
were harmless “in the strong sense that the jury must have found bribery 
and not just a failure to disclose a conflict of interest.”307  He wrote, “We 
have three principal reasons.”308 
Easterbrook’s first reason was Falsehood Number Seven—the claim 
described at the outset of this Memoir that the jury must have found Ryan 
guilty of taking bribes when it convicted him on the tax charges.309  The 
tax charges had nothing to do with the government’s bribery allegations, 
                                                 
303 See Separate App’x of Pet’r-Appellant, Vol. 2, supra note 59, at A-000417–18. 
304 Ryan v. United States, 759 F. Supp. 2d 975, 1000 (N.D. Ill. 2010).  See also id. at 1000–01 
(discussing counts 4, 5, and 7, the three counts involving Warner that the Seventh Circuit 
refused to review). 
305 Ryan v. United States, 688 F.3d 844, 850 (7th Cir. 2012). 
306 If this speculation is accurate, one may wonder why Judge Wood did not speak up after 
our petition for rehearing revealed that Ryan’s sentences had not expired.  Acknowledging 
that Judge Easterbrook’s declaration about the expiration of these sentences had misled her, 
however, might have been embarrassing both to her and to him, and if neither Judge Tinder 
nor Judge Easterbrook was willing to join her in vacating the unreviewed convictions, she 
might have seen no reason to make a fuss. 
307 Ryan, 688 F.3d at 849. 
308 Id. 
309 Id. at 849–50. 
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and Judge Easterbrook made up out of whole cloth the instructions he said 
had been given to the jury.310 
“Second,” Judge Easterbrook wrote, “both sides argued this case to 
the jury as one about bribery.”311  If the parties had indeed argued the case 
as one about bribery without mentioning that the jury had the option of 
convicting Ryan for failing to disclose a conflict of interest, Judge 
Easterbrook’s conclusion that “the jury must have found bribery” would 
have been appropriate.312  
Judge Easterbrook recited the government’s argument to the jury that 
Ryan “sold his office,” that he “might as well have put up a ‘for sale’ sign,” 
and that the “type of corruption here” was like a meal plan or open bar.313  
He did not note that the government failed to mention the bribery 
instructions even once or that it called the undisclosed conflicts instruction 
the heart of its case.  He also saw no reason to mention the government’s 
description of the undisclosed conflicts instruction as “the heart and 
soul . . . of . . . each and every Warner situation, because [of] that flow of 
benefits I talked to you about.”314 
Judge Easterbrook did refer to one portion of the government’s 
argument Ryan had stressed: 
The prosecutor told the jury that it did not need to find a 
quid pro quo in order to convict.  And that, Ryan 
maintains, means that the prosecutor was arguing that 
the jury could convict based on secrecy rather than 
bribery. 
 
We think that this misunderstands what the prosecutor 
meant by “quid pro quo.”  A dispute developed at trial 
about whether the prosecution had to show that a 
particular payment from Warner to Ryan matched a 
particular decision that Ryan made to confer benefits on 
Warner.  The prosecutor denied that matching was 
                                                 
310 See supra Part II.  Did I indicate that Judge Easterbrook was ready at last to address the 
issues briefed by the parties?  He was almost ready.  Even when Judge Easterbrook turned to 
the question of harmless error that the parties had long asked the court to decide, he began 
his analysis by advancing an outlandish argument of his own.  He did so although the 
Supreme Court had returned the case to the Seventh Circuit with directions to take account 
of a recent decision stressing the importance of adversary procedure.  Perhaps Judge 
Easterbrook cannot help himself. 
311 Ryan, 688 F.3d at 850. 
312 Id. at 849. 
313 Id. at 852. 
314 Separate App’x of Pet’r-Appellant, Vol. 2, supra note 59, at A-000417–18 (transcript of 
the government’s argument). 
2015] Easterbrook 77 
necessary and contended that taking money in exchange 
for a promise (explicit or reasonably implied) to deliver 
benefits in return is bribery; it isn’t necessary to show that 
Warner’s paying for the band at the wedding could be 
matched against a particular decision Ryan made in 
exchange.  The district judge told the jury that the 
prosecutor was right about this.  Thus when the 
prosecutor denied that it was necessary to show a quid 
pro quo, he was not arguing that it was unnecessary to 
show bribery; he was arguing that Ryan’s lawyers had 
defined bribery too narrowly.  This aspect of the 
prosecutor’s argument did not invite a conviction based 
on nondisclosure, rather than the receipt of bribes.315 
Falsehood Number Eight:   
A dispute developed at trial about whether the 
prosecution had to show that a particular payment from 
Warner to Ryan matched a particular decision that Ryan 
made to confer benefits on Warner. . . .  [W]hen the 
prosecutor denied that it was necessary to show a quid 
pro quo, he was not arguing that it was unnecessary to 
show bribery; he was arguing that Ryan’s lawyers had 
defined bribery too narrowly.316 
The dispute Judge Easterbrook described did not happen.  He made 
it up.  Ryan’s lawyers never maintained that “a particular payment from 
Warner to Ryan [must match] a particular decision that Ryan made to 
confer benefits on Warner.”  Indeed, in the conference on jury instructions, 
Ryan’s counsel declared, “I understand . . . [a] one-to-one match-up is not 
                                                 
315 Ryan, 688 F.3d at 850. 
316 Id. 
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required.”317  On that point, Ryan and the government had been in accord 
from the beginning.318 
Did the prosecutor “invite a conviction based on nondisclosure,” or 
did he “argu[e] that Ryan’s lawyers had defined bribery too narrowly?”  
See what you think: 
Have we proved a quid pro quo?  No, [we] haven’t.  Have 
we charged a quid pro quo?  No, we haven’t.  We have 
charged an undisclosed flow of benefits back and forth.  
And I am going to get to the instructions in a minute, 
folks, but that’s what we have charged. . . .  We have 
charged an undisclosed flow of benefits, which, under the 
law, is sufficient.319 
When Judge Easterbrook maintained that both sides argued Ryan’s case 
to the jury as one about bribery, he could not have failed to realize that the 
instructions provided another option and that the government 
encouraged the jury to use it. 
Judge Easterbrook wrote, “Our third principal reason for finding the 
error in the jury instructions harmless comes from analysis of the 
arguments pro and con about particular counts.”320  He then quoted at 
length the district court’s analysis of one count, a count involving another 
government contract awarded to a lobbying client of Lawrence Warner.  
Although professionals in Ryan’s office made the decision to award the 
contracts at issue in three of the counts the court refused to review, Ryan 
                                                 
317 Trial Transcript at 22081 (Feb. 28, 2006), United States v. Warner, 2006 WL 2583722 (N.D. 
Ill. 2006) (No. 02-CR-505).  After Skilling, fearing that the government and the courts might 
try to make the issue in Ryan’s case the propriety of a “steam of benefits” concept of bribery, 
we began the discussion of bribery in our Seventh Circuit brief by embracing this concept 
ourselves:   
Ryan does not doubt that accepting a “retainer” with “the 
understanding that when the payor comes calling, the government 
official will do whatever is asked” is bribery. . . .   He agrees that “where 
there is a stream of benefits given by a person to favor a public 
official . . . it need not be shown that any specific benefit was given in 
exchange for a specific official act.”  He affirms that “the intended 
exchange in bribery can be ‘this for these’ or ‘these for these,’ not just 
‘this for that.’” 
Brief and Required Short App’x of Pet’r-Appellant at 16, Ryan v. United States, 645 F.3d 913 
(2011) (No. 10-3964) (citations omitted). 
318 Of course all discussions of the law of bribery occurred outside the presence of the jury.  
Even if Ryan’s lawyers and the prosecutors had differed more than they did, there would 
have been no reason to mention their dispute in an argument to the jury. 
319 Separate App’x of Pet’r-Appellant, Vol. 2, supra note 59, at A-000416 (transcript of the 
government’s argument). 
320 Ryan, 688 F.3d at 850. 
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made the decision to award this one.  The portion of the district court 
opinion quoted by Judge Easterbrook declared that Ryan’s reason must 
have been either to promote effective law enforcement, as he claimed, or 
else: 
to compensate Warner for the stream of benefits he 
provided, as the Government urged.  The jury rejected the 
good faith motive.  Accordingly, the jury could only have 
convicted him on this count if it believed his conduct was 
a response to the stream of benefits.[321]  Ryan suggests 
that the only “private gain” he received for his 
intervention in this transaction was the approval of his 
friend.[322] . . .  [H]owever, the jurors must have rejected 
this argument; they were specifically instructed that if the 
benefits Ryan received from Warner were merely the 
proceeds of a friendship, they could not be the basis for a 
conviction.[323]  The court concludes that the jury must 
have found Ryan accepted gifts from Warner with the 
intent to influence his actions.324 
This passage illustrates the fallacy that we maintained infected most 
of the district court’s opinion.  The court spoke of “compensat[ing] Warner 
for the stream of benefits” and of “accept[ing] gifts from Warner with the 
intent to influence [Ryan’s] actions” as though they were the same thing.325  
But the gifts came at an earlier point than the “compensation.”  These gifts 
might have been unconditional and legitimate even if they inspired 
gratitude and later did prompt “compensation.”326  By equating 
subsequent favoritism for a benefactor with bribery, the district court 
concluded that the jury must have found bribery.  Few elected officials, 
however, disregard the interests of friends and supporters entirely.  If a 
jury finding that Ryan sought to benefit Warner established that he had 
                                                 
321 Under the instructions, the jury could have found a lack of good faith simply because 
Ryan failed to disclose a conflict of interest, and it might have found non-disclosure of a 
conflict even if Ryan’s only reason for approving the contract was to promote effective law 
enforcement.  But ignore that difficulty. 
322  The instructions did not require the jury to find any “private gain” at all on Ryan’s part.  
If he “misused his office” to provide “private gain” to anyone including Warner, he would 
have been guilty of honest services fraud. 
323 I will discuss this erroneous statement in text shortly. 
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committed bribery, almost every other elected official must be guilty of 
bribery too.327 
Among the errors of the quoted passage was its statement that “the 
jurors . . . were specifically instructed that if the benefits Ryan received 
from Warner were merely the proceeds of a friendship, they could not be 
the basis for a conviction.”328  The jury instructions mentioned friendship 
only in their description of an Illinois statute—one that forbade accepting 
gifts from lobbyists but exempted “anything provided on the basis of a 
personal friendship.”329  The court told the jury that violating this statute 
or any of a number of other Illinois statutes to produce private gain for 
Ryan or anyone else constituted honest services fraud.330 
If Warner’s gifts to Ryan were given on the basis of friendship, the 
jury could not properly have rested Ryan’s conviction on his violation of 
this statute.  But the jury could have based its conviction on any of a 
number of other grounds, including Ryan’s failure to disclose the conflict 
of interest created by Warner’s gifts.331  Although a gift from someone like 
Klein, who was not a lobbyist, could not violate the statute, it could create 
a conflict of interest, and a gift provided by a lobbyist on the basis of 
friendship could too.332 
Our brief explained how the district court had inflated its instruction; 
it had never told the jury that “if the benefits Ryan received from Warner 
were merely the proceeds of a friendship, they could not be the basis for a 
conviction.”333  At argument, however, Judge Wood asked, “So what do 
you do with the instruction that the jury was given saying don’t convict if 
you think it was just friendship?  Don’t convict if you think it was a gift.  
The jury did convict.”334  I replied: 
                                                 
327 See Alschuler, supra note 68, at 481–82 (noting that every definition of bribery looks to 
the moment an alleged bribe is received and that none includes subsequent favoritism for a 
benefactor). 
328 Ryan, 688 F.3d at 852. 
329 Separate App’x of Pet’r-Appellant, Vol. 2, supra note 59, at A-000421 (jury instructions 
describing 5 ILCS 425/10 as that provision read from January 1, 1999 through the end of 
2002). 
330 Id. 
331 See id. at A-000420 (the conflict of interest instruction). 
332 Only one of the benefits provided by Warner even arguably might have violated the 
statute forbidding the acceptance of gifts from lobbyists—his failure to charge a fee for 
adjusting an insurance claim after Ryan’s apartment flooded on Christmas Day.  See Brief 
and Required Short App’x of Pet’r-Appellant, supra note 317, at 8.  Campaign contributions 
were specifically exempted from the statutory prohibition, and none of the other benefits 
Warner provided went to people who were prohibited from receiving them.  See id.; supra 
Part III (describing the benefits given by Warner).  The statute was all but irrelevant to the 
government’s case. 
333 Brief and Required Short App’x of Pet’r-Appellant, supra note 317, at 25. 
334 Oral Argument, supra note 157, at 34:39. 
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There is no such instruction, Your Honor. . . .  [T]he only 
mention of friendship comes in the context of an Illinois 
statute that prohibits gifts from lobbyists and other 
prohibited sources, and it says that it does not prohibit 
gifts made on the basis of friendship.  It doesn’t say that 
failure to disclose a gift made on the basis of friendship 
can’t be the basis for a conviction on a conflict of interest 
theory.  It doesn’t say that Ryan can’t be convicted simply 
for favoring friends in the award of government 
benefits.335 
We pointed out the district court’s error once more in our 
supplemental brief following the Supreme Court’s remand.336  Thus we 
had noted the district court’s error three times before Judge Easterbrook 
embraced it.  I considered listing as Falsehood Number Nine the declaration 
that the jury was instructed not to convict if Warner provided his gifts on 
the basis of friendship.  Because this statement originated in an 
understandable error of the district court rather than a phantasm of Judge 
Easterbrook, however, it probably does not rise to the whopper level.  
Perhaps it proves only that talking to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit is like talking to a wall.  We noted the error a fourth time 
in our petition for rehearing,337 but the court saw no reason to correct it. 
X.  LARGER LESSONS AND SOME PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
A. Decent Procedure in an Adversary System 
Here’s what Judge Easterbrook wrote in 1989: 
I [offer no] praise for judges who . . . write essays about 
issues the parties did not present.  Just as the parties may 
choose the terms of their contract, they may choose the 
subjects of their litigation.  Resolving a case on a ground 
not presented denies the parties this autonomy and 
increases the risk [of] an uninformed opinion. . . .  It is 
                                                 
335 Id. at 34:48–35:35. 
336 See Circuit Rule 54 Statement of Pet’r-Appellant at 18–19 n.21, Ryan v. United States, 
688 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-3964). 
337 Ryan’s Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion of Rehearing En Banc, supra note 34, at 
8. 
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hard enough to navigate when the court sticks to 
questions fully ventilated by counsel.338 
The view of the adversary system Judge Easterbrook took in 1989 is 
the one endorsed by the Supreme Court: 
In our adversary system . . . we rely on the parties to 
frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role 
of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present. . . .  [A]s 
a general rule, “our adversary system is designed around 
the premise that the parties know what is best for them, 
and are responsible for advancing the facts and 
arguments entitling them to relief.”339 
The Court has said, “To the extent courts have approved departures 
from the party presentation principle in criminal cases, the justification 
has usually been to protect a pro se litigant’s rights.”340  It has quoted with 
approval Judge Richard Arnold:  “Counsel almost always know a great 
deal more about their cases than we do, and this must be particularly true 
of counsel for the United States, the richest, most powerful, and best 
represented litigant to appear before us.”341 
Judge Easterbrook’s saturnalia of sua sponte continued unabated after 
the Supreme Court remanded Ryan’s case for reconsideration in light of 
Wood v. Milyard.342  In Wood, the Court again reiterated the importance of 
adversary procedure.  It said, “[A] federal court does not have carte blanche 
to depart from the principle of party presentation basic to our adversary 
system,” and it added: 
For good reason, appellate courts ordinarily abstain from 
entertaining issues that have not been raised and 
preserved in the court of first instance. . . .  That restraint 
is all the more appropriate when the appellate court itself 
spots an issue the parties did not air below, and therefore 
                                                 
338 Frank H. Easterbrook, Afterword:  On Being a Commercial Court, 65 CHI-KENT L. REV. 877, 
880 (1989). 
339 Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243–44 (2008) (quoting Castro v. United States, 
540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
340 Id. at 243–44. 
341 Id. at 244 (quoting United States v. Samuels, 808 F.2d 1298, 1301 (8th Cir. 1987) (Arnold, 
J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc)). 
342 See Ryan v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2099, 2099 (2012) (remanding in light of Wood v. 
Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826 (2012)). 
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would not have anticipated developing in their 
arguments on appeal. 343 
Judge Easterbrook apparently was unimpressed.  He disregarded not 
only the Supreme Court’s admonition but also Seventh Circuit decisions 
insisting on the party-presentation principle.344  By the time Ryan’s case 
ended, he had made six rulings in favor of the government that the 
government had not sought—that by convicting on the tax charges the 
jury must have found bribery; that all of Ryan’s five-year sentences for 
                                                 
343 Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1833–34 (2012). 
344 An example is Judge Richard Posner’s opinion in Hartman v. Prudential Insurance  Co.  
The plaintiffs in this diversity action arising under Illinois law were two orphans.  As the 
court described the facts, the plaintiffs’ father wanted to make them the beneficiaries of two 
life insurance policies.  His estranged wife, however, bribed an insurance agent to thwart the 
father’s objective.  She then persuaded her lover to murder the father, and she collected a 
substantial settlement from the insurer. The defendants were the estranged wife, the bribed 
agent, and the insurer.  The district court entered summary judgment in their favor.  
Hartman v. Prudential Ins. Co., 9 F.3d 1207, 1208–09 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 The Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs were not entitled to 
the remedy they sought, reformation of the insurance policies.  Id. at 1214.  An intermediate 
appellate court in California, however, had approved a recovery of damages in a similar case.  
Id. at 1213.  Although the California decision broke new ground by allowing recovery for 
fraud by people who had not themselves relied on fraudulent representations, Judge Posner 
wrote that the court had “no reason to doubt that Illinois” courts would follow the California 
decision.  Id.  The Seventh Circuit nevertheless affirmed the judgment in favor of the 
defendants because the plaintiffs’ counsel had not sought recovery on the theory approved 
by the California court.  Id. at 1214–15. 
 “We are not happy with this result,” Judge Posner wrote.  Id. at 1214.  He explained, 
however, that a contrary ruling would create unfortunate incentives.  “One 
consequence . . . would be that prudent appellees would have to brief issues not raised or 
pressed by appellants lest the appellate court fasten on such a (non)issue and use it to upend 
the judgment of the trial court.”  Hartman, 9 F.3d at 1214.  (Of course a prudent party would 
have no reason to discuss issues not raised by his opponent if the court followed a consistent 
practice of allowing supplemental briefing before deciding a case on the basis of an issue not 
previously raised.)  “Another consequence would be to diminish the responsibility of 
lawyers and to reduce competition among them.”  Id. 
 Commentators have bemoaned the courts’ inconsistency.  Although they may strictly 
enforce the adversary system’s rules of forfeiture when deserving orphans seek recovery 
from murdering step-mothers and insurance companies, the same courts may follow what 
the commentators call “the gorilla rule” when their sua sponte actions will enable them to 
ensure the finality of judgments and the continued imprisonment of possibly innocent 
people.  See, e.g., Melissa M. Devine, When Courts Save Parties From Themselves:  A Practitioner’s 
Guide to the Federal Circuit and the Court of International Trade, 21 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 329, 
332–33 (2013); Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal:  The General Rule and the 
Gorilla Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1023, 1061 (1987); Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings:  
When Courts Deprive Litigants of an Opportunity to be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253, 1310 
(2002) (discussing inconsistent use of the gorilla rule); Tory A. Weigand, Raise or Lose:  
Appellate Discretion and Principled Decision-Making, 17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADV. 179, 180 
(2012) (“[W]hen the governing rule is declared to be both firm but discretionary, the hairs on 
the back of the neck tend to bristle.”). 
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mail fraud had expired; that the concurrent sentence doctrine (or 
something else) made it inappropriate to review more than two (or three) 
of these convictions; that Ryan had forfeited his objection to the 
undisclosed-conflicts instruction; that Day v. McDonough allowed the 
court to disregard the government’s waiver of a claim of forfeiture; and 
that a post-conviction petitioner may not complain about erroneous 
instructions that directed his conviction for noncriminal conduct.345  In 
most of these rulings, Judge Easterbrook flouted the basic principle of 
fairness the Supreme Court has said courts must observe when they find 
sufficient reason for departing from the party-presentation principle:  “Of 
course, before acting on its own initiative, a court must accord the parties 
fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions.”346 
When a litigant’s first opportunity to address a decisive issue comes 
in his petition for rehearing, it comes too late.  For one thing, petitions for 
rehearing are difficult to write.  An advocate must determine which 
audience to address.  Does he hope to persuade the erring opinion writer 
to repent?  Does he hope to persuade the other members of the panel to 
stand up to him?  Or does he hope to find champions among judges not 
on the panel?347 
Although an advocate is likely to criticize an opinion more forcefully 
when he has abandoned all hope of winning its author’s vote, he dare not 
punch hard even then—certainly not as hard as he would have if opposing 
counsel had advanced the same arguments.  A good advocate does not 
speak truth to federal judicial power; instead, as if appearing before 
Vladimir Putin, he seeks a way to make his point while minimizing the 
risk of umbrage.  In a petition for rehearing, he depicts every howling 
error and every lie as a slight misapprehension. 
Whatever an advocate says, it’s unlikely anyone will listen.  The 
Seventh Circuit advises lawyers, “Petitions for rehearing are filed in many 
cases, usually without good reason or much chance of success.  Few are 
granted.”348  The court’s view seems to be that its opinions are so close to 
perfection that lawyers should just save their time and their clients’ 
                                                 
345 Judge Easterbrook’s first opinion in Ryan’s case focused almost entirely on Ryan’s 
supposed failure to make proper objection to the instructional errors.  Ryan v. United States, 
645 F.3d 913, 915 (2011).  At the end of this opinion, however, Judge Easterbrook made clear 
that he had not retreated from his statements at argument that instructional errors are not 
cognizable in post-conviction proceedings.  See id. at 917 (“Jury instructions that misstate the 
elements of an offense are not themselves a ground of collateral relief . . . .  (Unconstitutional 
jury instructions are a different matter. . . .  But Skilling is about statutory interpretation.)”). 
346 Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 188, 210 (2006). 
347 Whatever the advocate’s goal, he is allowed only fifteen double-spaced pages to achieve 
it.  See FED. R. APP. P. 40(b). 
348 Practitioner’s Handbook, supra note 154, at 158. 
2015] Easterbrook 85 
money.  Federal appellate judges rarely back away from published 
opinions, and an advocate should bother them only when he has found a 
smoking gun. 
Partly because of the dismissive view most judges take of petitions for 
rehearing, the rule should be that an appellate court may never rest a 
decision in whole or in part on a ground the parties have had no prior 
opportunity to address.  There should be no exceptions.  When, following 
argument, a judge believes he has found something important the parties 
have missed, the court should invite supplemental briefing or else offer 
the parties another way to have their say. 
An informal procedure might suffice.  An individual judge could 
simply pose a question to counsel on both sides by letter (with copies to 
the other judges on the panel and to the court’s case file).  The judge’s letter 
could set forth an issue the parties had not raised and request responses 
by a specified time.  The use of this procedure might delay the issuance of 
an opinion, but so be it. 
Sending questions by letter might be useful even before argument if, 
for example, a judge found a thirty-five year old case cited by neither party 
that made him “wonder what we have got here if anything.”  The gain in 
the quality of answers produced by advance notice of some queries might 
justify the accompanying diminution of the questioner’s sadistic 
satisfaction.  Providing an opportunity to be heard before a court makes a 
sua sponte ruling is essential to fairness, and it also is likely to improve the 
quality of judicial decisions.  Judge Easterbrook’s rulings in Ryan show 
how wrong judges are likely to be when they strike out on their own.349 
B. Correcting Errors 
The New York Times publishes corrections every day.  When a Times 
story refers to 556 federally recognized American Indian tribes rather than 
566, the Times fixes it.350  When a story says that Sumba is southwest of 
Bali rather than southeast, the Times notes the error.351  When John 
Coppolella’s name has been spelled John Coppalella, a correction 
appears.352  And when I see a New York Times correction, I think:  Those 
guys are professionals.  They care about getting things right. 
                                                 
349 Admittedly, Judge Easterbrook managed to get things wrong even when he did allow 
supplemental briefing. 
350 Corrections: March 1, 2015, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
03/01/pageoneplus/corrections-march-1-2015.html [http://perma.cc/ZN7C-CC5L]. 
351 Id. 
352 Corrections: March 8, 2015, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
03/08/pageoneplus/corrections-march-8-2015.html [http://perma.cc/JL3N-GRHN]. 
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The Justices of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court’s Reporter 
of Decisions are professionals too.  Until the “final, official text” of a 
Supreme Court opinion appears in a bound volume of the United States 
Reports, all versions of the opinion issued by the Court note that it remains 
subject to revision.353  In practice, that means that every opinion remains 
subject to revision for as long as five years, and “the Justices—or, in any 
event, the Court’s staff—invest much energy in correcting . . . errors.”354   
When Judge Easterbrook maintained that George Ryan had received 
as much process as was due, he wrote, “Ryan’s trial lasted eight 
months.”355  The assertion wasn’t true, but the error wasn’t important.  
Ryan’s six-month trial was bad enough.  Many of us have made errors like 
that.  Nevertheless, our petition for rehearing noted the error, and it was 
not corrected.  None of the more serious errors described in this Memoir 
were corrected either, although they had been brought to the court’s 
attention in our petitions for rehearing. 
Why would Judge Easterbrook and his colleagues have left 
uncorrected, say, the untenable argument that Ryan’s conviction on the 
tax charges showed that the jury had found him guilty of taking bribes?  
Here are four hypotheses:  (1) The judges of the Seventh Circuit do not 
read petitions for rehearing.  (2) The judges felt in their bones that we must 
be wrong. (3) Although the argument based on the tax counts was 
untenable, it provided only one of three reasons for concluding that the 
jury must have found that Ryan took bribes.  Because eliminating this 
argument would not have changed the outcome of the case, the judges did 
not care that it was wrong.  And (4) Judge Easterbrook himself did not 
strike the untenable argument because acknowledging that he had made 
up the facts would have been embarrassing, and his colleagues remained 
silent because they did not want to embarrass or confront him. 
None of these reasons for refusing to correct an error is any good.  
When a judge learns at any time before his court issues its mandate that 
an opinion he has written or joined contains a clear error, he should act to 
correct it, and he should do so even if the error is not outcome-
determinative or important.  Like the journalists of the New York Times and 
                                                 
353 Bound Volumes, UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
opinions/boundvolumes.aspx [http://perma.cc/UU7V-9HBA]. 
354 Charles Rothfeld, Should the Supreme Court Correct Its Mistakes?  Yes, If the Process Is Fair 
and Open, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 56 (2014).  Even decades after the publication of an opinion, 
the Court may revise it through a formal, published order.  See Richard J. Lazarus, The 
(Non)finality of Supreme Court Opinions, 128 HARV. L. REV. 540, 561–62 (2014).  The Court 
recently began to provide greater notice of its “postrelease edits to slip opinions.”  UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT, http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinion/15 
[https://perma.cc/P8D3-AAKU].  
355 Ryan v. United States, 645 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir. 2011).  See supra note 355. 
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the Justices of the Supreme Court, the judges of the United States courts 
of appeals should take pride in their work and should think of themselves 
as members of a profession whose standards include truth-telling and 
accuracy.356 
XI.  CONCLUSION 
Judge Easterbrook is a stickler for rules who breaks the rules.  The 
other judges of the Seventh Circuit should enforce the rules, respect the 
basic principles of the adversary system, and check Judge Easterbrook’s 
penchant for confabulation.  28 U.S.C. § 46(b) does not put three judges on 
a panel to promote “collegiality.” 
                                                 
356 The authors of codes of judicial conduct might do well to borrow some key provisions 
of the Code of Ethics of the Society of Professional Journalists.  See SPJ Code of Ethics, SOCIETY 
OF PROF’L JOURNALISTS (Sept. 6, 2008), https://www.spj.org/pdf/ethicscode.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/HC6R-D6TM]. 
